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ABSTRACT 
In this research we built a custom experimental range using opensource emulated and 
custom pure honeypots designed to detect or capture attacker activity.  The focus is to test the 
effectiveness of a deception in its ability to evade detection coupled with attacker skill levels.  
The range consists of three zones accessible via virtual private networking.  The first zone 
houses varying configurations of opensource emulated honeypots, custom built pure honeypots, 
and real SSH servers. The second zone acts as a point of presence for attackers.  The third zone 
is for administration and monitoring. Using the range, both a control and participant-based 
experiment were conducted.  
We conducted control experiments to baseline and empirically explore honeypot 
detectability amongst other systems through adversarial testing.  We executed a series of tests 
such as network service sweep, enumeration scanning, and finally manual execution.   We also 
selected participants to serve as cyber attackers against the experiment range of varying skills 
having unique tactics, techniques and procedures in attempting to detect the honeypots.   
We have concluded the experiments and performed data analysis.  We measure the 
anticipated threat by presenting the Attacker Bias Perception Profile model.  Using this model, 
each participant is ranked based on their overall threat classification and impact.  This model is 
applied to the results of the participants which helps align the threat to likelihood and impact of a 
honeypot being detected.  The results indicate the pure honeypots are significantly difficult to 
detect. Emulated honeypots are grouped in different categories based on the detection and skills 
of the attackers.  We developed a framework abstracting the deceptive process, the interaction 
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with system elements, the use of intelligence, and the relationship with attackers. The framework 
is illustrated by our experiment case studies and the attacker actions, the effects on the system, 
and impact to the success.    
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
All war is based on deception, a quote by Sun Tzu in the Art of War [1].  This quote tells 
a truth about how humankind has leveraged the art of deception as a tool for quite some time.  
War being just one example, deception can have many drivers such as hunting, where the prey is 
deceived to enter a trap.  Merriam-Westers dictionary defines deception as the act of causing 
someone to accept as true or valid what is false or invalid.  It further states the fact or condition 
of being deceived, or something that deceives [64].  Both the offensive and defensive sides use 
deception as either ways to attack or protect.  Cyber is no different.  Cyber attackers leverage 
deception to hoax users into opening malicious emails [3].  Defenders use deception to lure the 
attackers away or to attack and study their actions [4].  
Cyber threat is typically followed by a defensive response.  In some situations, the 
intelligence is already available, and the threat can be detected.  Other times the threat is 
unknown and naturally become a reactive response. Threat can be characterized in diverse ways 
but is typically referred to as Advanced and Persistent threat (APT) [5].  In many ways the 
advanced portion may not be as sophisticated as first imagined.  Discovering a simple zero-day 
vulnerability and developing an associated exploit is always the unknown threat that is feared.  It 
gives the attacker the upper hand until eventually disclosed by means of correlating intelligence 
based on the attacker activities.  From there patches are created, announcements are made, and 
the cycles completes.  Being able to possibly trick the attacker to perform these unknown attacks 
on a system setup as a deception versus a true production system with critical data would be the 
ideal scenario.   
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Being able to deceive an attacker to thwart or study their tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTP) is a major benefit to a Cyber defender, especially if the attacker is unaware.  
As different deception approaches, such as honeypots, have been tried and tested, some succeed 
but many falls short or are not designed for the intended attacker [6].  Just recently in the 2017 
Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, where Symantec created and leveraged honeypots 
extensively for Internet of Things (IoT) technology [94].  Honeypots can vary in complexity 
from basic network socket listeners to a fully interactive system or application. Many are 
opensource, but some are custom coded that leverage real network services where they are 
modified, or substantial log monitoring is added.   A Cyber attacker detecting a system as a 
honeypot usually causes them to ignore or cease their TTPs.  The quicker they detect, the less 
effective for capturing useful attacker activity.   
A significant amount of research has been conducted into constructing and deploying 
honeypots as well in the analysis of acquired attacker TTPs but very little on experimental 
testing of honeypots to better understand their effectiveness.  Literature shows that some 
attempts have been made to experiment and test for the effectiveness of deception systems.  One 
such study focused on skilled participants attacking a defined environment with a pre-determined 
successful attack vector route and where deception was introduced in random or planned 
situations.  Participants were measured on how they handled the deception and its impact on their 
success and resulting attack vector map [82].  Another experiment focused on testing the 
effectiveness of honeypots and their deceptive levels in real networks by varying their location 
and virtualization [81].  A third research effort developed software tools and specific metrics to 
measure the effectiveness of honeypots. They did this by comparing specific areas of honeypot 
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filesystems against real filesystems identifying the variances [2].  Where these experiments 
homed in on the effectiveness of using deception, they lacked in the understanding how diverse 
honeypot designs and deployments are effective regarding detectability, especially with different 
grades of attacker skills. Therefore, we attempt to close the gap further and our contribution is 
threefold.  First, we further contribute by adding additional experimentation into the success and 
effectiveness of deception software.  Secondly, we explore and compare the use of emulated 
opensource deceptive software, namely honeypots, along with the use of real “pure” systems 
configured with monitoring as deceptive honeypots to understand their effectiveness and what 
characteristics of honeypots are more susceptible to detection.  Lastly, we corelate and observe 
the aptitude for diverse attacker levels to detect the presence of deceptive software. 
This dissertation is strongly experiential, specifically on testing honeypot systems in a 
custom developed experiment range. In our study, the focus is Secure Shell (SSH) based 
honeypots on Ubuntu Linux 14.04.5.  Shell based meaning command line used to login, interact, 
manage, and administrative a system.  Our primary experiment is a participate based controlled 
study that captures the ability for each to detect and possibly identify, out of a series of services, 
which are honeypots or not and justify why.  Some honeypot access will be leaked using 
provided open source intelligence (OSINT) and while other the default configuration or just the 
login prompt.  Participants will mark on a score sheet if they believe the services are not, 
suspicious, or indeed a honeypot.  Each participant will be asked to complete a survey to assess 
their skills and align them to a set of defined attacker profiles and bias model.  The intention is to 
determine detectability primarily in emulated versus pure honeypot design effectiveness and to 
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correlate the attacker skills in the participant survey to the detection rate based on the scorecard 
results.    
In addition to the primary participant-based study, a control experiment is conducted 
against the same experiment range to create a baseline model for various degrees of testing.  
These tests range from general basic network sweep, conducting active reconnaissance scanning, 
to performing manual testing.  General basic network sweep attempts to discover any known 
honeypots.  Active reconnaissance scanning leverages tools that are specifically configured to 
probe for anomalies.  Third is manual hands on keyboard penetration testing leveraging more 
advanced capabilities such as intercepting and modifying network traffic, living off the land 
using binaries inside honeypots to see if they function appropriately and so forth.   
Finally, we then use the results of these experiments to propose a deception framework 
that outlines deception to attacker relationship and what characteristics of honeypots are more 
susceptible to detection.  We articulate the attackers and use work completed on a bias profile 
perception model that attempts to loosely categorize them into profiles representing the spectrum 
of skills, capabilities, impact, and threat.  We use this model to map the success of identifying 
honeypots in various experiments to varying levels of attacker skills.  We also explore the 
deceptive process in a deception system state framework that outline the deceptive process and 
attacker influence.   
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CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND 
To effectively study defensive cyber deception, there first needs to be a basis of 
understanding.  Subsequent chapters will leverage this background material as a foundation to 
the presented concepts, approach, and results.  The Background information starts with a review 
of different secure shell server software packages.  Next attacker types are discussed grouped in 
to specific profiles.  We then cover the basics on Cyber intelligence and indicator research.  
Finally, a look into deception itself followed by the deceptive process reviewing three existing 
deception models.   
Secure Shell Technologies 
SSH, developed in 1995 by Tatu Ylönen from the Helsini University of Technology in 
Finland, is a widely used client-server service which allows for remote encrypted connectivity to 
a system via a command line interface [36].  SSH is typically leveraged to login into remote 
machines and execute commands but also has the capabilities to create network tunnels, conduct 
port forwarding, and support the transferring of data [34].  The extension of the protocol suite 
includes such utilities as secure file transport protocol (SFTP) and secure copy protocol (SCP) 
allowing for the transfer of data such as binaries.  SSH is a successor to legacy file transport 
protocol (FTP) and Telnet which allowed for similar functionality minus the link encryption.  
There are a few versions of the SSH protocol.  The original version by Ylönen was dubbed SSH-
1 and later found to be vulnerable in 1998 and again in 2001 with various encryption related 
issues.  In 2006, SSH-2 was released to help address many of the known issues with SSH-1. 
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This dissertation focused on deceptive based SSH honeypots to determine their 
effectiveness and detectability.  As a part of this research and experimentation, the use and 
inclusion of “real” SSH services are leveraged as a way of comparison and confusion.  Each one 
of those software packages are described in further detail below. 
OpenSSH 
OpenSSH is one of the most widely used SSH software packages for Linux today.  Many 
of the Linux operating systems come pre-packaged with OpenSSH as a default method to 
connect and manage the system remotely.  OpenSSH is a derivative of the original definitive 
version of SSH released by Ylönen as a free product.  As licensing restrictions became a 
continued issue with further development of free SSH software, Björn Grönvall, at the time a 
professor at Stockholm Sweeden, started to re-look at the original free SSH and fix several 
“bugs”, calling it OSSH or Open SSH.   At this time a popular of Linux variant, OpenBSD 2.6, 
was set for release and had hopes to include the OSSH server by Grönvall.  During this time, the 
OpenSSH project was maturing and eventually became the focus to eventually replace OSSH.  
Three months later OpenSSH version 1.2.12 became the main SSH server in the OpenBSD build 
[87]. Today at version 7.7, OpenSSH is available under the GNU Public License and can be 
installed on a wide range of operating systems. 
Dropbear 
A homegrown SSH server named Dropbear started its development in October 2002 with 
its initial release in April 2003.  Self-claiming to be installed in millions of computers, Dropbear 
is a small footprint SSH server and client that can be executed on any POSIX-based platforms 
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such as Linux, Mac OS X, Free BSD, or Cygwin.  Like the other SSH packages, it also supports 
SSH-2 and the use of SFTP and SCP as additional services within the protocol suite [89].  
Dropbear is the core SSH components of the OpenWRT project focused on an opensource 
wireless router firmware [90].  Dropbear is currently at version 2018.76 and is distributed under 
a MIT-style license [89]. 
Defining Attackers Profiles 
The attacker perhaps is the most variable aspect of the cyber defense equation. The 
degree of sophistication in which an attacker can carry out a specific TTP is a direct correlation 
to the threat they can deliver.  Some attackers discover new or unknown vulnerabilities, vectors 
of attack in which they exploit their target or sell for a profit [20].  Other attackers merely use 
tools, scripts, and pre-canned exploits, which have been already created by higher skilled 
individuals [21].  It is this range that begs the questions on what sort of attacker may be up 
against a deployed deception.   
 Attackers are not created equal.  Every attacker has its own set of skills, knowledge and 
understanding of technology and its way of being manipulated.  There are several ways to 
describe how attackers, hackers, differ and what makes up their skill level and motivation.  
Especially in the industry and news related articles, several security professionals have attempted 
to classify hackers into groups such as crime, spamming, spies, hacktivist, and APT [38].  There 
has been research in even differentiating the name or title hacker.   Studying the difference 
between a hacker and intruder and how the former looks for bugs or holes and the later takes 
advantage of those holes to gain unauthorized access [39].  Others have studied ways to detect 
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between a novice and advanced hacker based on validating conceptual expertise using a 
developed tool that can differentiate attackers based on their actions [42].  There is not much on 
the academia front that significantly hones in on defined profiles for types of attackers based on 
their bias, motivation skills, and more.  Because of this, we created groups for this research to 
simplify the types of attackers decided by their bias meaning their purpose, the set of capabilities 
they possess, and partially professional intuition.   The idea of an attacker bias is based on a 
concept found in a dissertation by M. H. Almeshekah [17].  Having a defined set of attacker 
profiles can help the industry and academic researcher alike benefit from a greater understanding 
of attacker differences. 
Some attackers are simply driven by the challenge of success in which they can “hack” a 
system [40].  Others have a more direct reason and invest a significant amount of funds and 
resources to succeed [41]. Outlined below are the attacker profiles considered in this research.  
They are defined by their motivation, objectives, typical TTPs, and methods [40].  The profiles 
will be used to help represent the attacker spectrum and how they compare with one another by 
their threat impact and likelihood of success. As it will soon be made clear, the profiles are listed 
in order of least to greatest threat. There is no rigid placement for where a potential attacker or 
hacking group may best fit.  It is based on following information gleamed from intelligence 
reports, their political/military backing, source of funding, and motivation.    
Annoyance Threats 
Representing the lower bound, individuals or script kiddies have been on the steady rise 
as exploits to circumvent technology continues to be automated, shared and published. Attackers 
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in this category are generally unskilled and utilize existing tools or scripts created by other more 
advanced attackers or industry security professionals.   Attacks are broad based and typically 
unknown or irrelevant and considered “noise” but occasionally can be problematic. TTPs include 
the use of known worms/viruses, exploit kits, automated scanners, crawlers, SPAM, basic 
malware, spyware and adware [38 ,40]. A summary of the profile is: 
• Scope: broad-based 
• Duration: short-lived 
• TTPs: leverage others tools and development, worms/viruses, exploit kits, automated 
scanners, crawlers, SPAM, basic malware, spyware and adware 
• Motivation: thrill, bragging rights, learning 
Cyber Crime 
Cyber Crime is opportunistic short-lived broad-based attacks motivated primarily by 
financial gain identity theft, credit card fraud, extortion, and botnet recruitment.  Typical TTPs 
include extortion malware techniques, phishing or SPAM emailing, and hosting malware on 
legitimate websites [38, 40, 71].  The recent “Wannacry” worm attack is an example of how 
encryption was used to block access to victim data.  A ransom to the attackers using bitcoin was 
the only way to acquire the decryption key [43, 44]. WannaCry infected computers in over 150 
countries using a leaked NSA Windows SMB vulnerability zero-day exploit released by the 
hacking group Shadowbrokers. It is believed that the North Korean nation sponsored hacking 
group Lazarus created the worm.  Though their primary focus may be nation sponsored 
espionage, this purpose was to extract capitol and cause havoc. The damage by the worm was 
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limited due to a security researcher who quickly registered a domain name he found in the 
malware code that disrupted communications. Over two hundred thousand systems were 
impacted globally, but less than one hundred thousand dollars were collected by the attackers 
[61]. A summary of the profile is: 
• Scope: broad-based 
• Duration: short-lived 
• TTPs: similar as annoyance profile plus extortion malware techniques, phishing or SPAM 
emailing, and hosting malware on legitimate websites.   
• Motivation: money 
Cyber Terrorism 
Cyber terrorism, synonymously to how they act in physical warfare, conduct disruptive or 
destructive acts on behalf of or in support of a terrorist group or organization. Exploitation 
lasting from mid to long term, their approach is typically targeted with some degree of 
sophistication in support of their ideology.  Typical TTPs include DDoS, known and custom 
exploitation kits, modified malware, and creative delivery approaches.  In a paper by the United 
State Army War College Press, they explain how terrorists are becoming more cyber engaged for 
anonymous communications, to cause substantial amounts of damage with little cost versus 
traditional ground confrontations and invites a connection to a worldwide audience for 
propaganda purposes [45].  In December 2015, cyber terrorists perpetrated a successful attack 
against three energy distribution companies in the Ukraine and disrupted the electricity supply of 
over 230,000 people.  This attack occurred during the Russian-Ukrainian war and has been 
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attributed to a Russian group known as Sandworm.  The campaign required careful planning and 
reconnaissance and lead to months of work to return the control centers to a fully operational 
state [60]. A summary of the profile is: 
• Scope: semi-targeted or targeted 
• Duration: mid-long term 
• TTPs: distributed denial of service (DDoS), known and custom exploitation using kits, 
modified malware, and creative delivery approaches. 
• Motivation: money 
Hacktivism 
Hacktivism, stated simply, stands for “politically motivated hacking” [59].  Many skilled 
individuals join an organized group and put their hacking abilities to serve a cause with a 
political, ethical, religious, or retaliatory motive. Typically, short term, these attacks cause a 
significant amount of havoc and are in many times disruptive to operations by disclosing 
sensitive information for public viewing. Their techniques include DDoS, traditional hacking 
techniques, spear phishing and more [48, 71]. The group Anonymous is a known example of a 
hacktivist hacking group that is seen today performing such style attacks [47]. The ideology of 
this group is fluid and diversified. The group supports digital piracy and has targeted 
entertainment entities such as the Recording Industry Association of America and the Motion 
Picture Association of America with attacks in response to their support of copyright 
enforcement [58]. They have been associated with everything from charity activities, such as 
Operation Oklahoma for flash flood victims, to political activism, such as Operation 
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CyberPrivacy protesting Canadian anti-terror legislation, and many more [58].  A summary of 
the profile is: 
• Scope: semi-targeted or targeted 
• Duration: short-lived 
• TTPs: DDoS, traditional hacking techniques, custom exploitation, crafty spear phishing 
and more 
• Motivation: political, ethical, religious, or retaliatory  
Insider Threat 
A legitimate internal individual on the “trusted” side that has alternative motives with 
their access is a major concern to many organizations and governments.  Insider attackers are 
typically planted, cohered, or disgruntle and have access to trusted systems or critical data not 
normally available to outsiders.  Insiders abuse their approved credentials, privileges, and access 
to acquire data for exfiltration or to plant and install malware.  Some have the necessary 
technical skills, but most are carrying out instructions from another advanced entity outside of 
the boundary (many times nation sponsored).  The length of any given intrusion can either be 
quick or long term if successful and undetected. Insider attacks can also include physical 
sabotage in systems, security, or surveillance.  A known insider threat example is the executive 
administrative assistance at Coca cola who used her access to steel and attempt to sell the 
formula for Coke to Pepsi [49].  Another example involves a Pennsylvania utility worker who 
was sentenced June 2017 for hacking into his former employer computer systems and disabling 
the remote water meter readers which the company manufactured. This attack disabled remote 
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metering and forced the dispatch of numerous technicians to physically read meters until the 
system could be restored [56]. A third example is a software engineer, for an unnamed financial 
services firm in New York, who was arrested in April for steeling proprietary code from his 
employer. Allegedly, the engineer used multiple methods to exfiltrate the data which included 
steganography to hide the code within pdf files masked as personal documents attached in emails 
and uploading of encrypted zip files to a third-party website [57]. A summary of the profile is: 
• Scope: targeted 
• Duration: short to long-lived 
• TTPs: Similar as seen in the annoyance profile plus extortion malware techniques, 
phishing or SPAM emailing, and hosting malware on legitimate websites.   
• Motivation: money, exfiltration of intellectual property for purposes of eliminating years 
of research and development, competitive economic and/or military advantage 
Nation Sponsored  
Representing the upper bound, nation-sponsored attackers are targeted, organized, and 
well-funded by a government entity or influential military to carry out cyber espionage and 
pilfering data.  Commonly referred to as Advanced and Persistent Threat, these campaigns are 
usually medium to long term where exfiltration of intellectual property for purposes of 
eliminating years of research and development, competitive economic and/or military advantage.  
Typical TTPs include zero-day exploits, social engineering, phishing, watering holes, and 
focused perimeter-based attacks.  Many of the APT reports by Manidant such as its first, APT1, 
describes how the Communist Party of China tasked the Chinese People Liberation Army to 
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perform such attacks [50, 51]. An example Nation sponsored is the Lazarus Group Cobra 
Guardians of Peace/Unit.  This group is believed to be a North Korean government funded 
hacking team. They were responsible for the catastrophic hacking of Sony Pictures in 2014 
which caused a significant amount of destruction to Sony data and their ability to operate [55, 
46].  A joint Department of Homeland Security & FBI Alert was released on June 13th, 2017 
warning of a distributed denial of service botnet infrastructure and other tools the group has been 
utilizing to target media, aerospace, critical infrastructure, and financial organizations [52].  
Another example is a group called Shadow Brokers which is responsible for the creation of 
Stuxnet malware which leverage leaked NSA tools and targeted specific Siemens SCADA 
systems utilized by Iran in the enrichment of uranium in 2010 [53].  Eternal Blue, one of the 
SMB vulnerabilities released by the Shadow Brokers in the April 2017, was believed to be 
utilized by the Lazarus Group for WannaCry [54]. Another hacker group named OilRig group, 
which categorized as APT 24, targets primarily the middle eastern region with cyber espionage.  
This group is believed to be performing cyber espionage reconnaissance efforts to support 
Iranian nation-state interests focusing on finical, government, energy, chemical, and 
telecommunications [101].  A summary of the profile is: 
• Scope: semi-targeted or targeted 
• Duration: medium to long-lived 
• TTPs: zero-day exploits, social engineering, weaponized phishing, watering holes, and 
focused perimeter-based attacks. 
• Motivation: exfiltration of intellectual property for purposes of eliminating years of 
research and development, competitive economic and/or military advantage 
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Basics on Cyber Intelligence and Indicators 
By design of the technology we use, cyber attackers leave evidence behind.  This 
evidence can be produced at various stages of a cyber-attack and come in many forms such as 
logs, files, processes.  These cyber clues are key in developing an intelligence foundation of 
adversary cyber TTPs.  By capturing and sharing this information, it is possible to be further 
prepared in detecting or discovering and attacker [67].  Developing an indicator surrounds the 
notion of giving meaning or bounds in defining an indication that something exists with pre-
defined criteria.  An Indicator can be thought of as a clue or flag to a bigger activity or situation.  
Being able to identify something based on an indicator can help identify potential concerns or 
cause an action to take place [65, 67]. An indicator can be as simple as checking to see if a user 
logged into a system or an obfuscated string inside a file. With massive amounts of information 
being generated by the continued addition of IT devices, there is a vast big data problem [66]. 
Among this big data are the very clues that lead to the TTP of a cyber adversary.   
There has been extensive research into using security intelligence in cyber defense.  
Intelligence Driven Defense (IDD) is how defense contractor Lockheed Martin refers to their 
approach in tackling the cyber attacker [65].  Their approach spawns form the ideas in their 
paper Intelligence-Driven Computer Network Defense Informed by Analysis of Adversary 
Campaigns and Intrusion Kill Chains.  In this paper they describe the IDD concept as a risk 
management strategy that addresses the threat component of risk by incorporating analysis of 
adversaries, their capabilities, objectives, doctrine and limitations.  They furthermore discuss 
how this is a continuous process leveraging indicators to discover new adversary activity which 
thus creates additional indicators.  They define indicators as either being atomic, computed, or 
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behavioral.   Atomic meaning cannot be broken down any further an is at its lowest term.  
Computed meaning indicators which are derived from data created by a cyber-attack incident.  
Behavioral being collections of computed and atomic indicators outlining an event of the two 
combined [65, 72].  Referencing the Cyber Kill Chain in figure 1, if an adversary is using email 
to deliver a weaponized attachment, attributes about this adversary may be known such as the 
email address used [3].  This would cause their action to be blocked and thus no further 
penetration into the subsequent level of the chain.  However, if indication of attacker activity was 
discovered in the later phases of the chain, then there would be additional clues in the preceding 
phases [65]. 
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Figure 1: Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain    
 
Many projects such as Open IOC, industry companies such as FireEye, government 
funded groups such as the Defense Security Information Exchange have explored and shared in 
the idea of intelligence through indicators to detect.  The Open IOC project (indicator of 
compromise) is a collection focusing on known TTPs in a computing environment [68].  The use 
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of open source indicators is a good place to gain intelligence and see how others are tackling the 
indicator challenge and sharing the actions attacker carried out.  The DoD Defense Industrial 
Base (DIB) Collective Sharing Environment (DCISE) host out of the Department of Defense 
Cyber Crime Center (DC3) serves as a network for DoD contractors to share unclassified threat 
information to broaden the detection and warning capabilities [69].   
Indicators can take on many forms and are primarily driven by indicating something by 
giving a clue to a larger context.  Indicators allow for something to trigger, correlate, or flag on 
its existence.  The indicator lifecycle begins with artifacts of data that is either generated because 
of an attackers TTPs or of due to the actions of a defender.  This data or artifacts can indeed be 
something of value and a clue that sheds lights onto an activity.  As figure 2 depicts, artifact data 
can be generally noise but upon being something of value it becomes discoverable where it can 
be found and identified or tied to a given fact.  Once this artifact is created as an IOC is generally 
detectable and represents a smaller subset of the grander universe of data that has significant 
relevance to an event of interest [7].  
 
Figure 2: The universe of cyber data  
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Existing research in Cyber Deception 
  Deception comes in many forms and the distinction between what is and not deception 
can have blurry lines.  For this Bell and Whaley proposed two simple concepts of dissimulation, 
hiding the truth and simulate, showing the false. Following this simple concept ensures that the 
intention is about deceiving versus another behavior.  Dissimulate and simulate can be dissected 
in many ways but some defined techniques behind dissimulation include masking the real to 
blend in, repacking to appear as something else and dazzling to confuse.  Some of the techniques 
behind simulate include inventing the false when it does not exist, mimicking the false by 
appearing to be like something else, and decoying to divert attention elsewhere.   Using these 
basic techniques helps better define and develop deception for cyber defensive [12]. 
Cyber deception is frequently synonymous with nefarious activities led by attackers.  It is 
the act of a cyber defender using deceit to study, detect or learn from the adversary. Security 
through obscurity has always been viewed as a negative practice in the IT security world [13].  
Any additional security that can add a level of defense makes sense versus not having it at all 
(most situations).   
Since several motives are behind cyber defensive deception and many definitions exists 
on the specifics, several models have been developed to help frame the cyber defense deception 
process.  Each model brings its own unique approach to formulate a progression of sorts on how 
cyber defensive deception is played out and perceived.  Some models have limitations and are 
only fixated on specific types of deception.  Three existing models are described in which each 
brings its own unique approach to organizing and illustrating the deceptive process.  With their 
approach there are both commonalities and difference in the attributes they describe.  In addition, 
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they each have their own method of execution and their ability to decide the flow of events.  
Both the attributes and decidability are the focal point of understand the models and their 
process.   
Basic Model 
The Basic Deception-Process was created by Yuill and others [14,15] as a model for 
designing deception operations of Computer Network Defense (CND). There are three main 
stages and a decision gate that resembles a deterministic state diagram approach.  Referring to 
figure 3, the first stage is the deception operation development which is further broken down into 
three sub categories of planning, building the deception, and preparing to engage target.  
Planning includes the deception goals, identifying potential targets, for the deception, or 
determining operation requirements.  Next, Building the Deception emphases on the story line 
and the overall event schedule.  The storyline is the pseudo outline, detailed as necessary, of the 
deception structure.  Lastly, Preparing to Engage the Target is ensuring the readiness of the 
deception. Target is used to represent to interacting with the deception, namely attackers.   
Once the Deception Operation Development stage is complete the model continues to the 
Deployment stage.  In this stage the main objective is about deploying the deception “storyline” 
to production.  For instance, if the deception involved a web application, the first stage would 
include the planning of the web application, building the web application, and preparing it to go 
live.  This stage makes the web application available and visible to external targets [14].  
Once a target is engaged the model steps to the Target Engaged phase which surrounds 
the idea of whether the target has been deceived.  Procedurally, the deception story is received, 
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accepted, and the intended action was taken.  Any resulting feedback, intelligence, which the 
target may have created is recorded and either alerted to or analyzed later. At some point during 
or after the target engagement, a decision gate determines if the deception should continue “as 
is”, return to the Deception Operation Development stage, or terminate the deception all together 
[14, 15]. 
 
 
Figure 3: Basic Deception Process 
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The Incorporated Model 
The incorporate model shown in figure 4 was presented in a paper titled Planning and 
Integrating Deception into Computer Security Defense by M. H. Almeshekah et al [16,17]. 
Besides being linear in nature, the model is comparable to the Basic model by having three main 
stages which include planning deception, implementing and integrating deception, and 
monitoring and evaluating deception.  The first stage is broken down into six sub categories 
where each is concentrated at ultimately orchestrating the deception and how it can be 
incorporated into computer defense. 
The first sub category of the planning deception stage is defining the strategic goal and 
what is the hopeful outcome of the defensive ruse.  Ensuring the overall objectives are defined 
and the actual deception is plausible is key.  This leads to the next sub category which 
emphasizes on how the attacker (synonymously also referred to as targets) will react to the 
desired deception. This can be a very important depending on what type of attackers are trying to 
be deceived.  The degree of complexity in the deception can really be impactful for script kiddie 
style attacks but prove almost comical to nation state sponsored adversaries that exhibit APT 
campaign style opposing force attacks [5, 18].  This is where the third sub category plays in 
integral part in understanding the attacker biases. The attacker bias studied upfront helps to 
perceive possible preconceptions of attackers and the degrees of complexity they are capable of.  
Knowing or even planning this upfront can make the deception better aligned with the right 
target attackers.  We focus on the importance of knowing the attacker and their bias in chapter 3. 
 The forth sub category of the planning stage concerns what is simulated or dissimulated 
for the deception to.  This step is centered at identifying and analyzing the patterns and 
 23 
 
characteristics of what and when to deceit. The Incorporation model research further explains 
various system components where deception may be applied into the functionality and/or state of 
the system.  State being for example System Software and Services, System Activity, System 
weaknesses, System configuration and several others which are listed [16].   To put simply 
developing the storyline of the deception.   
The fifth sub category is feedback channels and knowing what to look for when the 
deception occurs.  To have successful feedback channels, it is critical to understand what to even 
look for within the system and the deployed deception. For example, if the deception involved 
hosting a web application that as purposely susceptible to a specific vulnerability and would 
require and advanced attacker to discover and exploit, then the scope is significantly small, and 
the feedback is thus narrow to that one thing.  However, if the deception was designed to include 
an entire operating system being subject to compromise by attackers, then the feedback is much 
wider.  This causes a higher amount of required intelligence to effectively monitor and recognize 
attacker activities.   Monitoring is key to knowing if your deception is successful or not.  This 
leads to the final sub category under planning which is the risk and countermeasures. Deceptions 
have risk and specific consequences if all does not go as planned.  Knowing these risks and 
developing hypothetical countermeasures is an effective way to further ensue a successful 
deception [16].    
Once the planning stage is complete the model moves to the Implementing and 
Integrating Deception stage.  This is a straight forward step dedicated on implementing the 
deception that was planned and described in the storyline.  Once deployed, the model moves to 
the next stage which is monitoring and evaluating the deception.  Taking the identified feedback 
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channels from the planning stage and monitoring the deception for the identified activity to 
demine if the deception has been engaged upon and the activities of the attackers are what is 
expected.  The final output is whether the attackers believed, suspected, or disbelieved the 
deception which result is the model halting [16].   
 
 
Figure 4: Deception Incorporation model.  Process is linear in nature and starts in the Planning Deception section 
and end in the Monitoring & Evaluating Deception section with a ultimate believed, suspected, or disbelieved. 
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Cyber D&D Model 
A third model is presented by K. Hecman et al [19] in a paper called the Spiral Cyber 
Denial and Deception lifecycle management process.  This model, unlike the Basic and 
Incorporated models is cyclical in nature allowing for iterative progression of the deception until 
it has been tested and considered ready for production.  Referring to figure 5, the process beings 
in the center of the circle inside the Plan Cyber D&D quadrant.  This quadrant is very similar to 
the Basic and Incorporated models which is concentrating on planning the deception.  While the 
approach in this first stage compared to the other models is similar, this model introduces some 
different elements.  The cyber D&D TTPs training curricula, best practices, and metrics are 
examples of elements not seen in other models being reviewed.  These additional elements are 
observables and gauges to the effectiveness of the deception being planned which can potentially 
generate useful metrics for later analysis [19]. 
Once the planning stage is completed the model spirals to the implement quadrant.  This 
portion focuses on incorporating any necessary tools that are required, additional threat data 
which is very similar to the TTPs, and further concentration on managing the metrics collected.  
As the defined deception is further compiled it is then passed in the spiral to the next quadrant on 
deploying and executing.  During this stage, additional fine tune modifications are considered to 
ensure the successfulness of the deception. Monitoring, observing, and collecting field data and 
further metrics are also a part of this stage.  Once the deception is considered complete or has run 
its course, the final quadrant is post deployment analysis [19].   
Post deployment analysis is studying the deception through the spiral lifecycle and 
assessing its effectiveness.  The deception outcome is analyzed to determine if additional 
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improvements are needed in the planning and implementation stages and if the deception is still a 
prototype.   Reviewing the feedback to the deception planning is also considered as another 
measurement to help make the determination on if additional prototypes are needed to get the 
deception in a desired state.  The spiral continues around the circle through the four quadrants 
with the intention of the spiral tightening to a final state in the center of the circle within the 
deploy and execute stage [19].  
 
Figure 5: Spiral Cyber Denial and Deception lifecycle management process.  Process starts in the Plan cyber D&D 
quadrant and spirals clockwise through the other quadrants until ending up in the Deploy and Execute quadrant after 
many possible iterations.  The tightness of the spiral can dictate the number of possible iterations.    
 
Common Tools and Utilities 
Any number of tools or utilities could be used to conduct research, perform testing, 
enumerate information, or exploit a vulnerability.  In our research, many tools and approaches 
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are leveraged for evaluating and detecting a deceptive system, namely honeypots.  Some of the 
common tools which are used and mentioned in this research are highlighted in this section to 
give additional context to their purpose and usage. 
Nmap 
Nmap is an acclaimed open source network mapping tool that performs network 
discovery and security auditing.  The tool has several options and can be leveraged for network 
inventory, service patch levels, monitoring system uptimes, and more.  The tool leverages raw IP 
packets in unique ways to determine what hosts are available, their listening services, versions, 
operating systems, potential firewalls in use, and dozens of other characteristics.  The tool also 
has an incorporated scripting engine which allows for the execution of code that exists as 
packages with the tool or can be custom created.  Scripts for example can examine an IP and 
service and determine if its vulnerable using proof of concept exploit code.  Nmap traditionally is 
used via the command line interface but comes in a graphical user interface (GUI) called 
Zenmap [77].   
Metasploit 
Another common tool known to many elite and script kiddie attackers alike is the 
Metasploit Framework written by H.D. Moore and is currently part of Rapid7.  This tool focuses 
on developing, executing, discovering, enumerating and exploiting code against remote target 
systems.  This is done by coded modules written in ruby that can typically be configured within 
the frameworks msfconsole utility.   For example, if a remote system was vulnerable to a well-
known exploit on a remote port, using msfconsole a pre-coded module most likely exists that can 
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be configured and executed to exploit the vulnerability.  Metasploit is known for its shellcode 
creation, which is a small piece of code used as the payload in the exploitation of a software 
vulnerability [76].  The framework also includes packing capabilities to hide code within binary 
and obfuscation tools to help evade anti-virus.   [62, 77]. 
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CHAPTER THREE: DECEPTION AS A SOFTWARE 
Many of the deceptive processes outlined in the background chapter are deployed as 
software solutions commonly referred to as honeypots.  This chapter explores the background of 
honeypots in addition to specifics that will be used throughout this research.  We will start by 
exploring the motivation of a honeypot.  Next discuss the various attributes that make up the 
various kinds of honeypot interaction.  We review past research and experiments done in testing 
honeypot systems.   Finally, we will review some of the different SSH based opensource 
honeypots using within this research.   
Honeypot Fundamentals 
Honeypots have been in existence for quite some time introduced publicly in the 1990s 
and early 2000s. The Cockoo’s Egg, a novel by Clifford Stoll, references using a honeypot to 
track a spy committing computer espionage [85]. In 1990 the BackOfficer Friendly, a simple to 
install, easy to configure, free honeypot developed by Marcus Ranum at Network Flight 
Recorder was designed to run on the Windows operating system and emulate several services 
such as to FTP, Telnet, SMTP, HTTP, and POP3 [83]. Founded in 1999, the Honeynet project is 
a leading international non-profit security research organization focused at studying the latest 
attacker TTPs and developing open source security tools to improve Internet security [33].  In 
2002, a paper titled The HoneyNet Project: Trapping the Hackers by Lance Spitzner describes 
the evolution of the Honeynet project and how that has led to defining some of the first honeypot 
nomenclature such as the types, purpose, of what defines a honeypot [84, 86].  Today the use of 
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honeypots is every more expanding.  As the cyber war escalates there has been an increased 
demand in acquiring new intelligence and alerting.   
Honeypots are picked at, probed, and attacked just as any other IT computing device is 
subject to.  The main difference, a honeypot is designed and developed to monitor, aiding in the 
detection of Cyber attacking or information systems misuse.  The motivation can be: 1 - ways to 
deflect or distract the attacker to a false product system.  2 - To gain intelligence and study their 
TTPs in a research capacity, specifically unknown attacks. 3 – To simply be used as alerting 
mechanisms [24,25].   
Honeypots can be categorized based on their design and deployment approach [86].  The 
design can differ depending on the objective of the honeypot, typically focusing on the 
motivation, data collection or alerting.  The two main honeypot design types are emulated and 
pure.  Emulated honeypots are coded software that mimics a real application, network socket, 
operating system, and other service.  Many emulated honeypots have been developed over the 
years and are available opensource.  Pure honeypots are completely based on production or real 
operating systems and applications with additional monitoring, tapping, or recording techniques 
to capture attacker activity [74]. Since pure honeypots are based on the real system or application 
they are typically custom built for each situation.  However there does exist packaged pure 
honeypot solutions such as TELPOT which leverages a real Telnet services but adds in a proxy 
layer to intercept and record all data [35].   
Using table 1 below, honeypots have many tentacles to their design which directly 
correlates to the interaction level or experience the attacker is presented with.  For both emulated 
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and pure designs, the interaction levels can range between low and high with various possibilities 
in between.  Low interaction typically only allows minimal interfacing with the honeypot such as 
a static web page or TCP socket [22, 23].  For low interaction, most of the backend parts of the 
honeypot system are considered isolated and is primarily focused on logging.  High interaction 
honeypots are more sophisticated as they are meant to be more complex and engaging, providing 
an experience to the attacker with a system or application [21].  A high interaction honeypot can 
easily be setup as a low depending on its configuration.  For example, restricting access to just 
the FTP service login prompt verses allowing the attacker to guess and be successful at logging 
in and interacting with the actual command prompt.  The higher the interaction level, the more 
information is typically collected for studying attacker TTPS such as system and application 
logs.  On the contrary, the higher the interaction level the increased probability the honeypot will 
be detected by the attacker.  The lower the interaction level the less maintenance is required.  
Scalability is also easier the less intensive the deception solution tends to be. 
Table 1: Honeypot design types and resulting components 
 Emulated Pure 
Interaction Low High Low High 
Maintenance Low High Low High 
     
Risk of Attack/detection Lower Higher Lower Higher 
Intelligence gathered Limited Extensive Limited Extensive 
Typical Code Opensource Custom Built 
   
 
The deployment approach can vary as honeypots have been developed in many types 
such as the traditional single host or service, deployment and connected to honey networks, 
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honey tokens, and honey bots [26].  The main driver behind the type of honeypot is indicative of 
its purpose.  If the idea is to study attackers in the botnet arena, then honeypots would be 
developed to mimic either a botnet server or more so a client of an existing adversary botnet 
cluster.  The idea of linking honeypots together in a network or mesh is not new.  In 2006, a 
presentation by the Honeynet project organization call GDH1 – Global Distribution Honeynet 
was focused on deploying high interactive honeypots globally with a central location for data 
collection [32].  This same project was further expanded in 2007 with GDH2 named HonEeeBox 
which focused on Rapid Deployment of Many Distributed Low Interaction Malware Collectors 
[33].  The main intention was fast, cheap and the ability to create a massive malware sensor grid 
collecting data.   
The ability to gain access to wide range of emulated honeypot software has become 
trivial with code repositories like GitHub [27].  The ability to have pre-configured containers 
“ready to go”, such as Docker, essentially allows for a honeypot to be deployed in minutes [28].   
The idea of multi-honeypot packages has also become popular.  A common one is T-POT which 
contains a custom-built web interface to manage numerous docker deployed honeypots and its 
collected data [63]. This ease however includes the risk of honeypots being too simplistic, 
“rubber stamped” or perhaps known and detectable by the adversary.  Some honeypots are 
indeed real systems, services, or application that instead have been rigged with a significant 
amount of monitoring and proper network isolation.  With virtual technology becoming widely 
used in legitimate servers and services, the idea of a honeypot being hosted on virtual 
environments is not as suspicious as once before.   
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Opensource Honeypots Used in This Research 
Below are the emulated shell-based honeypots which will be used in this research for 
various experiments and testing.  Depending on how they are used, they can range from low to 
medium-high interaction.  Low based on accessing only the login prompt and TCP socket.  
Medium-high based on logging in and interacting with the shell.  In this research, it is the 
intention to use the honeypots as configured and downloaded for one variant.  Then subsequent 
variants with changes made to its configuration with the motivation to further elude the attacker.   
Figure 6 illustrates the linage for when each honeypot was conceived, last updated, and 
more importantly where it may have been forked from one another.  The foundation for many of 
the common honeypots seen today stem from the original Kojoney honeypot.  A fork was made 
to create kojoney2 which was then the basis of Xsweet.  Equally Kippo was forked from kojoney 
and then resulted in the inspiration and foundation for Cowrie.  Each bring their own 
characteristics but share common elements such as using python and more specifically the 
twisted packages which provides an event driven network engine for development in TCP.    
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Figure 6: Lineage of opensource honeypots used in this research.  Depicts Kojoney as the original honeypot with 
subsequent honeypots forked and related.   
Kippo 
Kippo is a medium interaction SSH honeypot based directly on the SSH honeypot named 
Kojoney [30].  Originating in circa 2009, Kippo is designed to log a wide range of attacker 
activities to include brute force login and full shell interaction.  Some key features include a fake 
file system with the ability to add/remove files and the use of trickery in pretending to execute 
binaries, commands and responding to the user.  The honeypot was developed in Python and 
Python Twisted and is somewhat maintained by community contributions.  Kippo was last 
modified in September 2016 and is available as source binaries on GitHub in addition to several 
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custom configured Dockers containers that exist today [29].  It is suspected that the version of 
Kippo being used in this research is 0.9.  This version has remained as the documented version 
since 2014. 
Cowrie 
Cowrie is a fork from the popular honeypot Kippo.  A security researcher, Michael 
Oosterhof, took notice circa 2015 of a Kippo deployment that was not logging complete details 
of some of the discovered SSH attacks.  As a result, logging was enhanced and additional 
capabilities such as proxy support, SFTP, SCP were added.  This resulting branch was named 
Cowrie to distinguish it from the original software.  Like its predecessors, Cowrie was also 
developed in Python and Python Twisted.  Cowrie was last updated in August 2018 at the time of 
this dissertation writing and is currently at version 2018-6-29.  The source binaries are available 
on GitHub in addition to the many custom configured Dockers containers [31]. 
Kojoney2 
Kojoney2 is based of the original honeypot project Kojoney developed by Jose Antonio 
Coret [91, 92] and was last updated in December 2014. Derived from the Spanish word cojon 
combined with honey, Kojoney was developed by Justin Klein Keane in around 2012 to mainly 
improve many of the “bugs” discovered in its original predecessor and to also re-structure the 
configuration of the honeypot.  Kojoney2 is written in Python and Python Twisted and primarily 
focuses on simulating a real SSH environment. Kojoney2.  More attention was placed on how 
the honeypot responds to legitimate shell commands by expanding this capability over the 
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original Kojoney.  Kojoney2 is currently at version is 2.1 and is available for download as source 
binaries on GitHub [92].   
Xsweet 
Xsweet was developed by Ousama AbouGhoush and in 2014 was a fork from the 
kojoney2 honeypot.  Xsweet is based off Kojoney2 and shares a similar functionally and motive 
of logging attempts to gain access and providing shell functionality to the attacker.   Xsweet pays 
more attention to an elaborate shell experience as the authors emphasis was to capture what the 
attacker did once inside.  In the original motivation for this honeypot, it was deployed to a cloud 
hosting service where massive brute force login attempts were attempted against all ports and 
services.  Xsweet is assumed to be at version 1.0, was last updated in February 2018, and is 
available for download as source binaries on GitHub [36].   
SSH Honeypot Detection 
Trying to detect a honeypot service is like looking for a noise abnormality when 
attempting to detect a submarine from the natural sounds of the ocean. Different techniques have 
been attempted and some successful in detecting the presence of a honeypot service.  As each 
honeypot is developed and customized to its deployable requirements, certain characteristics can 
be evident that separate themselves from other services.  For example, a real SSH server may 
respond differently in the networking TCP packets versus a Kippo honeypot.  Others include the 
way the banner statement is portrayed, TCP fingerprint, simulated operating system version, 
login prompts and many more characteristics that can be possible indicators to authenticity.   
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Some but very little has been developed to aid in the detection of honeypot technology.  
Some commonly known cyber software tools have been enhanced with indicators that flag when 
responses about a service appears to match a honeypot characteristic.  Nmap is a good example 
of where detection indicators were leveraged to help further strengthen the possibility to 
accurately fingerprint or detect a remote TCP service.  Figure 7 are snippets of the Nmap 
services file that contains characteristics that equate to a honeypot software.  For example, in the 
last snippet a specific way the simulated SQL server responds matches the recorded indicator 
thus flagging it as Dionaea honeypot MS-SQL server [77]. 
 
Figure 7: Snippet from the Nmap service identification file 
match ssh m|^SSH-2\.0-Twisted\r?\n| p/Kojoney SSH honeypot/ 
i/protocol 2.0/ 
 
match ssh m|^SSH-([\d.]+)-OpenSSH_([\w.]+)\r?\n.*aes256|s p/Kojoney 
SSH honeypot/ i/Pretending to be $2; protocol $1/ 
match honeypot m|^503 Service Unavailable\r\n\r\n\0$| p/Network 
Flight Recorder BackOfficer Friendly honeypot/ 
 
match honeypot m|^\r\nlogin: \0$| p/Network Flight Recorder 
BackOfficer Friendly telnet honeypot/ 
 
match honeypot m|^\r\n[-\w_.]+ [\d.]+ - Unauthorized access 
\x07prohibited under penalty of law\.\r\n\r\nlogin: \xff\xfc\x01| 
p/Whiz Kid Technomagic Imaginary telnet honeypot/ o/Windows/ 
cpe:/o:microsoft:windows/a 
 
match honeypot m|^Microsoft Windows XP \[Version [\d.]+\]\n\(C\) 
Copyright 1985-\d+ Microsoft Corp\.\n\nC:\\>| p/honeyd cmdexe.pl/ 
match ms-sql-s 
m|^\x04\x01\x00\x2b\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x1a\x00\x06\x01\x00\x20
\x00\x01\x02\x00\x21\x00\x01\x03\x00\x22\x00\x00\x04\x00\x22\x00\x0
1\xff\x08\x00\x02\x10\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00| p/Dionaea honeypot MS-
SQL server/ 
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Metasploit is another tool that has honeypot detection capabilities added such as the 
module named detect_kippo written by Andrew Morris.  Seen in figure 8, an extract of the ruby 
code sends unexpected data to the remote network SSH service and in its response checks for 
specific error messages.  If those messages matches the indicators identified in the module 
“Protocol mismatch” and “bad packet  length” then it returns as a Kippo honeypot.  Figure 9 
demonstrations the detect_kippo module being accessed within the Metasploit msfconsole [69].    
 
Figure 8: detect_kippo Metasploit framework module   
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Figure 9: detect_kippo being accessed through Metasploit msfconsole. 
 In a recent research paper, dated around the time of this dissertation writing, titled “Bitter 
Harvest: Systematically Fingerprinting Low-and Medium-interaction Honeypots at Internet 
Scale”, the authors Alexander Vetterel and Richard Clayton focused on techniques to identify 
honeypots based on specific flaws within protocols that are subtly different from the systems 
they are impersonating [75].   The research focused on three protocols starting with SSH then 
telnet, and finally HTTP/Web.   Looking more closely at the SSH protocol, the research looked 
for deviations in responses to a client version string SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT and secondly at the 
SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT packet.   
For the version, they created 192 specific client version strings following the syntax of 
“SSH-protoversion-swversion SP comment crlf”.  They compared several systems which 
included five-real OpenSSH servers, and an instance of TwistedConch, four Kippo honeypots, 
and four Cowrie honeypots.    For the SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT packet, they focused on the 
algorithms defined in RFC 4250 where they generate thousands of custom variants using each 
algorithm, correct and incorrect packet padding, random bytes, and more.  In total for both the 
algorithm packet and client version, they generated over 58k custom packets. 
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After sending over 157 million probes where each character is recorded from a server 
response they gain insight into normal SSH connection behavior.  The find that the most 
common client version string is “SSH-2.2-OpenSSH \r\n” and for details in the 
SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT  packets they discovered that “ecdh-sha2-nistp52” is the most common 
key-exchange algorithm, “ssh-dss” as the host key, “blowfish-cbc” as the encryption algorithm, 
“hmac-sha1 as the mac algorithm, and “zlib@openssh.com” as the compression algorithm. After 
conducting scans internet-wide based on what they learned from the smaller subset of systems, 
they indeed were able to identify a considerable number of Kippo and Cowrie honeypots as each 
responded differently to the custom packets.   It was determined that most implementations of 
SSH services were OpenSSH 6.6 and 7.2.  They were able to gleam that the 
SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT packets used random bytes for Kippo and Cowrie compared to 
OpenSSH which uses null.  The abnormality could also be seen for the various encryption 
algorithms being supported by the honeypots versus the real SSH servers.  By the completion of 
the research, Cowrie had already addressed the use of random characters in 
SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT by replacing it with null.   
Past Research on Testing Honeypots 
Historically honeypot research has focused twofold, being the novel new honeypot 
technology and very much on what sort of data the honeypots collects.  As new honeypots are 
being conceived, developed, tweaked, deployed, and eventually attacked, the question is raised 
on how effective honeypots are, especially to varying attackers.  With the ease of access and 
quick deployment capabilities, a Cyber defender could deploy a honeypot, visible to attackers, 
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with the hopes it assists them collecting data to better understand their enemy or to lure them 
away to something more enticing.  The defender may have no idea if the honeypot software 
contains any coding errors or vulnerabilities thus allowing for undesired vectors of attack. Or 
how easy is it to detect that this software is deceptive in nature which results in altering the 
attacker TTPs.  This section will review some of the different experimentation and testing 
experiments done by past researchers.  These experiments give insight into what has been 
attempted, how it worked, results, and what to experiment that is different.   
The first research experiment centered on providing an environment where attackers were 
asked to hack their way through a series of systems, penetrating as far as they can go to the end 
state.  Deceptions where used in some cases during their journey to see how this changed the 
results, additional time it took, and different vectors they ventured to reach the end state.   The 
second research experiment was testing the effectiveness of honeypots in different environments 
by determining if using virtualization effected the results.  Both a residential internet connection 
and the network for the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) were used as entry points. In 
summary, all three research of experiments presented a diverse approach to testing the 
effectiveness of cyber deceptions and honeypots.   
Red Teaming Experiments with Deceptive Technologies 
 Fred Cohen et al in a publication named for this section heading developed and executed 
an experiment “designed to measure the effects of deception defenses on attacks against 
computer systems and networks”, using the words from their own publication [82].  To 
understand the implications of technical deceptions in information protection, an experimental 
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assessment was conducted with specific deceptive methods done against human attackers.  
Several objectives were outlined: 
• Improving the knowledge of the participants on how systems can be attacked and 
defended. 
• Understanding how much it takes to tell the attacker before they finally area able 
to defeat the deception.   
• Understanding the dynamics of the attacker group, specifically on how they were 
with success, failure, impact on workload with deceptions, coming up with ideas, 
stagey, and tactics. 
• Understanding the impacts of initial access to deceptive defenses 
Over four weeks, six different teams participated in the challenge where the use of 
deception was not communicated in the beginning of the experiment.  The experiment was 
conducted five times each lasting four hours where six exercises were completed in each.  Thus, 
the total number of experiments conducted was 30 where some had the deceptions turned on, 
turned off, or at random.   Participants were academically skilled college students studying 
computer security at a national laboratory.  The same experiments were also conducted with 
highly skilled ethical professional attackers that do this type of testing as a career.    
Each experiment had known attack graphs followed by actual attack graphs for each 
group that participated.  The use of these graphs helped provide a means for measuring the 
effectiveness of defenses by measuring the progress by attackers over time.  The research 
discovered that when deception was enabled, attackers never got as far toward the truth as they 
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did when the deceptions were disabled.  Meaning the deceptive techniques seemed to have 
worked and when enabled, the attacker would always go the route of the deception attack graph 
and were convinced they were heading down the right direction.  When deception was turned on, 
the real system was less obvious while the deceptive systems were more obvious and available.  
If attacked and exploited, the attacker may think the game is complete.  In some cases, teams 
would declare victory over the experiment when the deception kept them away from the real 
target.   
The results indicated in summary that the network technology deception capabilities are 
very effective at what they are designed to do but can be significantly improved upon especially 
in its content.  Another significant observation is that deception enables the attackers to waste 
time trolling down deceptive rabbit holes giving the defender more time to react, gain insight, 
collect data, and reducing defensive cost.   
 Testing Deceptive Honeypots 
In a thesis by Aymen Yahyaoui for the Navy Postgraduate School, an experiment was 
conducted focused on testing the effectiveness of different honeypots and their deceptive levels 
in real world networks by varying their location and by adding in virtualization [81].  Objectives 
are outlined as follows: 
• Measure the effectiveness of honeypots by comparing ingress network traffic to 
the honeypots to a legitimate website. 
• The compare malicious and legitimate traffic distribution by country and region.  
• To measure the effectiveness by varying the location and type of implementation.  
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The experiment took place at two locations.  The first being a residential area, where a 
HTTP honeypot Glastopf was connected to the internet for a period of two months.  The second 
location was within the NPS network utilizing the same Glastopf HTTP honeypot in conjunction 
with the Kippo SSH honeypot, also for a two-month duration.  In addition to the two deployed 
honeypots on the NPS network, Glastopf and Kippo were also deployed on virtual machines.  All 
traffic was captured and analyzed using SNORT intrusion detection.   
The results for comparing ingress network traffic to the honeypots against ingress traffic 
to a legitimate website was not an easy task according to the researcher.  The biggest hurdle was 
separating the legitimate network traffic from the malicious.  The assumption was made that 
since the legitimate webserver was educational-institution which showed no value to real 
attackers.  Results showed that the HTTP honeypot showed more attacks than the legitimate web 
server over the same period.  To further make the HTTP honeypot more enticing (more 
deceptive) to an attacker against the NPS network, additional content was added such as links, 
static content from other websites, and more.  This resulted in the number of attacks increasing, 
mostly automated scripts.  
The Kippo SSH honeypots, being on both a real and virtual system, operated for more 
than four months and saw a significant difeent in the number of attack occurrences.  One 
example, on the real system, Kippo saw 87197 attempts for the user root where on the virtual 
system Kippo saw 186214.  This same increase was seen across all username and passwords 
attempted.  The surprising result was the number of attempts conducted by each unique IP 
addresses was far less on the virtual system. Another interesting results for virtual versus reals 
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was the Glastopf HTTP honeypot also exhibited command-line attacking on the virtual system 
not seen on the real honeypot host.    
The diversification of countries was also interesting part of the experimentation results.  
For the Glastopf HTPT honeypot, internet crawlers, code that is used to index search engines, 
was the most prevalent and not categorized as a specific country.  France came in as the highest 
source folled by the Netherlands than the U.S.  It was assumed that most would come from the 
Asian Pacific region, but spoofing is suspected.  This did not match the comparison for the real 
webserver used in comparison of network traffic where China cover 60% of the total followed by 
the U.S. and Ukraine.   
The ending results demonstrated that indeed the location changed the effectiveness of the 
honeypot.  In testing the HTTP honeypot in both locations, it showed after a few weeks that the 
NPS honeypot had more attacker activity, as something on the NPS network is mostly likely 
more promising than in in a residential area.  
Measuring the Effectiveness of Honeypot Counter-Counter deception 
A third research by Neil Rowe developed software tools to assess the effectiveness of honeypots 
using metrics to calculate and summarizes a file system by different vectors [2].  Their focus was 
developing a way to test the effectiveness of a honeypot filesystem with determining how close it 
resembles a real file system.  The research objectives are outlined as follows: 
• “Design a honeypot to look like a normal computing system” 
• “Given a computer system, decide whether it is a honeypot or not” 
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• “Design a honeypot to be maximally effective at fooling attackers into thinking its 
is a normal computer system” 
• The compare malicious and legitimate traffic distribution by country and region.  
The idea of counter-counter deception is key in this research with two strategies being 
possible such as seeking the unconscious clues and seeking the inconsistencies.  Like intrusion 
detection with signature-checking versus anomaly, unconscious clues arise when speed the 
required of the deceiver is having trouble, such as a liar who fidgets.  Other unconscious clues 
are the number of words used and the generality of being vague.  Inconsistencies are difficult to 
track due to the complex nature of a deception and typically are in the form of inadvertent 
mistakes.   
 Throughout the experiment, several tools were developed to capture data in both real and 
honeypot filesystems such as NFDir.    The most focused tool evaluated or compared filesystems 
from one another by conducting 36 unique metrics on each directory of a filesystem.  Analyzing 
about 1500 common directories a minute, the content is subject to first order and second order 
statistical analysis.  First order being the overall file and directory tree structure, names of 
directories and so forth.  For example, the directory name summer2015 for an academic system 
is not abnormal.  Second order statistics resulting from mathematical calculations such as 
median, mean. standard deviation, minimum and maximum, say for a filename.  Based on their 
results and outcome of comparisons, it was proven successful at effectively providing a counter-
couterdeception capability, that being it can detect based on the clues that a filesystem is perhaps 
a deception.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: CUSTOM PURE HONEYPOT AND EXPERIMENT 
RANGE BUILD 
 In this chapter we explore the customization that was necessary for conducting empirical 
experimental testing within this research.  We first explore the buildout of a custom honeypot 
solution which leverages a real operating system.  This pure honeypot has the main intention of 
differentiating itself from the normally easy to get opensource emulated honeypot solution we 
see today.  The other major contribution is the custom build of an experiment range.  This range 
is used to conduct experiments against the custom and identified opensource honeypot software, 
introducing an attacker point of presence, and monitoring activities to understand events that 
unfold during experiments. 
Custom Pure Honeypot Buildout 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, pure honeypots are built based on using a real 
filesystem versus an emulated approach found in most opensource solutions.  As a part of the 
experiment range built for this research, a custom pure based honeypot is introduced alongside 
the use of emulated honeypots.  By creating a pure honeypot, the idea is to have a system with 
the same motivation as an emulated solution but better blend in with real production systems.  
Several degrees of complexity can be applied in further masquerading the existence of honeypot 
behaviors and monitoring.  In this research the amount of intricacy was not the primary emphasis 
but more so the use of a pure honeypot among many other emulated deployments as a delta.  For 
a real filesystem to be leveraged, some configuration, customization, and code was introduced.   
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Using OpenSSH 6.2 on Ubuntu 14.04.5, the downloaded source code was modified and 
re-compiled after adding in additional functions to capture the login credentials, both successful 
and not.  As seen in figure 10, the auth.c OpenSSH source file was modified with the code 
outlined within the red box [73].  After an attacker successfully authenticates to the system 
through the SSH connection, it is ideal to have the interaction recoded for later analysis.  To 
accomplish this, a shell file was created named bsh, seen in figure 11, where the tee utility is 
leveraged to append to a log file all interaction for the spawned bash shell [87].  This bsh shell 
profile was then added to the user edna which was the only authorized user to login.  This 
information is leaked in an OSINT file.  This build constitutes variant pure-1.  The only other 
pure honeypot in the Services-NET is pure-2, which is a clone of pure-1 but has no working 
credentials that are easily guessed.  The intention is to have the attacker limited to only 
interacting with the login prompt and TCP services itself.  The /etc/passwd files shows the bsh 
shell associated with the user edna.  More on the use of the edna account will be described in the 
Services-NET section.   
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Figure 10: Custom code addition to OpenSSH auth.c file  to allow for password entry to be capture to log file. 
 
 
Figure 11: Custom shell file capturing all TTY  
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Figure 12: Password file showing custom shell for user Edan as /bin/bsh  
 A comparison between emulated and pure honeypots is listed in table 2 which compares 
and highlights their advantages and disadvantages.  The raw TCP port for a native OpenSSH 
server is managed directly by the application and its code on how to use the socket.  For most 
emulated honeypots, an intermediary solution is leveraging twisted python.  This can potentially 
lead to indication that the socket is fake. The filesystem typically for emulated honeypots is 
custom-built using python and is isolated within VirtualEnv [72].  Isolated meaning it is a virtual 
location for python code to execute that rides on top of a real operating system and contains 
potential attackers to only its contents.  Challenging as it is, the fake filesystem must be coded 
and built up to match the appearance and functionality of a real filesystem.  Commands must be 
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coded in for each utility and its expected results.  This is much easier on a pure honeypot 
leveraging a real operating system with real commands and utilities.  Also, some virtual 
filesystems reset back to a baseline after each use.  If a file were created and the attacker logouts, 
the files persistence is not there when the attacker returns.  Monitoring and logging are typically 
integrated into the honeypot software as part of its intention and solution.  The ability to hide the 
fact that logging and monitoring occurs is much stealthier.  In a pure deployment, additional 
logging and monitoring must be added and could potentially be discovered since the attacker has 
more access to the real filesystem.  Logging is easier in emulated solutions as the virtual 
environment can dump its data to the backend real filesystem. In a pure setup, the data must be 
hidden or offloaded to another system.  Emulated honeypot used in the experimental range will 
be describe in more detail in the Services-NET overview.   
  
 52 
 
Table 2: Comparison between emulated and pure honeypot solutions 
 Emulated Honeypot Pure Honeypot 
TCP Port Managed – Typically twisted 
python 
Native raw socket 
Filesystem Emulated – typically python 
virtualenv 
real 
containment Isolated to emulated 
filesystem 
Can traverse into other areas 
of real system 
Commands Fake response and only has 
support for specific pre-coded 
commands 
Real output and can support 
all possible commands 
Monitoring and Logging Extensive and built-in as part 
of honeypot solution 
Limited and must be added 
Persistence of data Some honeypots only always 
Environment Build Overview 
The range and its physical construction with logical interconnectivity are depicted in 
figure 13.  The environment was built into three specific zones each serving a purpose, hosting 
their own set of virtual machines.  Each zone is managed by a centralized pfSense firewall 
allowing or restricting specific communications among zones and the internet.  The various rules 
are depicted in figure 14 as an attempt to abstract the data flow and illustrate what is permitted to 
traverse each zone from and ingress or egress perspective.  The pfSense firewall also serves as a 
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virtual private network (VPN) Server allowing secure external internet access to the Attackers-
NET.  The use of a dynamic DNS service DDNS associated the WAN IP address to the domain 
name deception.ddns.net.  Both the attacker-Net and Services-NET will be elaborated in 
subsequent sections.   
 
Figure 13: Experiment environment    
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Figure 14: Experiment environment network flow and firewall rules 
Table 3 lists the software and hardware used to host the experiment range.  The most 
significant and required resource is RAM due largely to virtual machines each requiring a slice.  
Each zone has its own dedicated server acting as the virtual machine host with VMWare 
VSphere (ESXi) 6.5.0 as its operating system.  Virtual machine baselines were built using 
Ubuntu 14.05.4 for systems residing in the Services-NET and Kali Linux 2018.1 along with 
Windows 10 in both the Attacker-NET and Admin-NET.   
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Table 3: Hardware list for experiment range 
 Software Hardware RAM Storage 
Attackers-NET VMWare ESXi 
VSphere 6.5 
Dell Poweredge 
2970 – 8 CPUs x 
Quad-Core 
Opteron  
32 GB 2 x 1 terabyte 
RAID 1  
Services-NET VMWare ESXi 
VSphere 6.5 
Dell PowerEdge 
1950 – 8 CPUs x 
intel Xeon 3.0 
GHz 
64 gigabyte 2 x 1.8 terabyte 
RAID 1 
Admin-NET VMWare ESXi 
VSphere 6.5 
Intel NUC – 4 
CPUs x core i5  
16 gigabyte 500 gigabyte 
Solid State Drive 
Firewall PFSense 1.x Generic 
appliance - 4 
CPUs  x Intel 
Celeron 2GHz  
4 gigabyte 3.6 gigabyte 
 
The overall build time took approximately nine months in total on a part time basis.  This 
was largely due to the research and selection of honeypot software, ability to get said software 
compiled and executed, and making overall honeypot configuration changes.  Some of the 
leveraged honeypots use legacy libraries and dependencies which required the need to augment 
the existing code with newer library imports or the installation of legacy packages. Other factors 
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include building the overall network topology, virtual server software installation and 
configuration, physical network cabling, cooling of the systems, backup and continuity, in 
addition building and installation of the various virtual machines leveraged in the various zones.  
In addition, time was consumed due to a degree of trial and error and at times adjustments made 
to the overall concept. The Attacker-NET and Services-NET are described in detail in the 
following sections.  The Admin-NET is primarily focused on accessing the virtual servers, 
virtual hosts real OpenSSH TCP ports for system administration, configuration, and accessing 
log files.  
Attacker-NET 
The Attacker-NET is where white hat hackers leverage virtual attacker platforms to 
attack systems residing the Services-NET.  Figure 15 depicts the list of virtual machines hosted 
on the ESXi 6.5.0 virtual server web management tool.  Kali Linux version 2018.1 was selected 
as the preferred platform.  Kali comes pre-packages with many of the necessary open source 
tools such as Nmap, Metasploit, and others. It also comes pre-configured with the necessary 
development compilers, libraries, and other packages supporting rapid the availability to perform 
a specific technical task.   Besides the use of Kali Linux, Microsoft Windows 10 is also available 
in the attacker-NET arsenal.  The windows image, being the opposite compared to Kali, is a 
vanilla bare install with no pre-installed or configured hacker or development tools.  Anyone 
using a windows machine will have to live off the land or go to the internet and download 
needed tools/code. 
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Figure 15: VMWare ESXi VSphere web administration page showing list of virtual machines within the Attackers-
NET. 
As mentioned, a pfSense firewall manages access between the various zones.  Referring 
to figure 14, it is important to note that the main idea was to restrict the Attackers-Net from only 
seeing the actual honeypots services and nothing else about the machine hosting them.   For 
example, looking at an IP, only port 22 for SSH would be revealed verses all other ports listening 
on the same SSH server.  Also, it is possible for attackers to see other systems in the Attacker-
NET zone but depending on the experiment the intention is for attackers to only target the 
identified scope within the Services-NET.    
 Services-NET 
The Services-NET or sometimes referenced to as the Honey-NET is where a bulk of the 
experiment range build time was spent.  The main purpose of this zone is to host the targets that 
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will be scrutinized, probed, and possibly attacked from the Attacker-NET.  There are twenty 
available SSH services in the Services-NET made up of seven non-honeypot, and thirteen 
honeypots where two of those are pure. Figure 16 shows the list of virtual machines residing on 
the ESXi virtual server from the web graphical management tool.  In addition, the twenty SSH 
virtual machines are listed with their specific purpose in table 4.  The table lists specifics about 
each system and include information such as the IP addresses assigned, name of the host virtual 
machine, and if it is a real SSH service or a honeypot, default configuration, and more.   All 
virtual machines in the Services-NET are Ubuntu Server 14.05.4 as its host operating system.   
 
Figure 16: VMWare ESXi VSphere web administration page showing list of virtual machines within the Services-
NET. 
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Table 4: Deployed virtual machines (some honeypots) in Services-NET 
IP Host Name Variant 
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10.1.10.200 Dropbear1 Dropbear-1         
10.1.10.201 Clover2 Kippo-2         
10.1.10.202 Shwaa3 Cowrie-3         
10.1.10.203 Sherbert Openssh6.6-1         
10.1.10.204 Jokey2 Xsweet2         
10.1.10.205 Shwaa2 Cowrie-2          
10.1.10.206 Frisky1 Kojoney-1          
10.1.10.207 mona Openssh6.2-2         
10.1.10.208 Frisky3 Kojoney-3         
10.1.10.209 Clover3 Kippo-3          
10.1.10.210 Unix-the-cat pure-1         
10.1.10.211 Lilly1 Openssh6.6-2         
10.1.10.212 shwaa Cowrie-1         
10.1.10.213 Dumbo Dropbear-2         
10.1.10.214 Jokey Xsweet-1         
10.1.10.215 Frisky2 Kojoney-2         
10.1.10.216 Lilly1 Openssh6.2-1         
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IP Host Name Variant 
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10.1.10.217 Clover Kippo-1         
10.1.10.218 Lilly Openssh6.2-1         
10.1.10.219 Unix-the-cat Pure-2         
 
We first describe the real non-honeypot SSH servers that are deployed in the Services-
NET.  Referencing table 5, there are a total of seven non-honeypot real SSH servers comprised 
of two versions of OpenSSH and a single version of Dropbear.  Like the custom pure honeypots, 
each real SSH server has multiple deployed variants such as Dropbear-1, and 2.  This signifies 
that the software was used but in different configurations.  For each, variant 1 is a default install 
of the software package but does not have working credentials, thus focusing the attackers on the 
login prompt and TCP service itself.  Shell interaction would have to be done by other means 
such as exploitation.  Variant 2 is a clone of variant 1 with the main change being removing all 
the possible successful username and password combinations and only allowing the username 
edna and password connie to successfully login. The intention is to leak the working credentials 
to the experiment attackers with the goal of reducing time spent on password brute force attacks 
and more attention given to attempting determine if the real SSH server is a honeypot or not.  
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Table 5: Deployed real non-honeypot 
 Variant 1 Variant 2 
OpenSSH6.2 
2 variants (1 x variant 1, 1 x variant 2) 
Default install 
No working credentials 
Default install 
edna/connie credentials 
OpenSSH6.6.1p1 
3 variants (2 x variant 1, 1 x variant 2) 
Default Install 
No working credentials 
Default install 
edna/connie credentials 
Dropbear 2013.60 
2 variants (1 x variant 1, 1 x variant 2) 
Default Install 
No working credentials 
Default install 
edna/connie credentials 
 
Following this same theme for the emulated honeypots, variant 1 is the default install of 
the honeypot solution.  Default meaning as in configuration, access, and how its presented to the 
attacker.  Variant 2, a cone of variant 1, is where configuration changes were made with the 
intention to only altering the configuration to a point that helped further obfuscated its existence 
but leave intact its original solution.  Example modifications include the banner, emulated 
hostname, IP addresses and more.  Also, for variant 2 a major change was removing all possible 
successful username and password combinations only allowing the edna account authorized for 
login. This was done primarily that easily guessing successful credential combinations would 
potentially divulge the existence as it being a honeypot.  Variant 3 is a clone of the variant 2 but 
does not have any working credentials, minus the root account that has a complex password.  
Each of emulated honeypot configurations are discussed in further detail below showing 
examples of the configuration changes made, installation trial and error, and adjustments to 
honeypot code.  An overall configuration summary is listed in table 6.    
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Table 6: Deployed emulated honeypots in Services-NET 
Honeypot and Build Variant #1 
• Default 
configuration 
• Default honeypot 
accounts 
Variant #2  
• clone of variant 1 
• Edna account only 
Variant #1 
• Clone of variant 
2 
• No accounts 
(minus root 
admin account) 
Kippo • Default • Changed banner 
• Changed Hostname 
• Changed fake IP 
• Changed ifconfig 
• Removed all users 
minus edna 
 
• Removal of edna 
account 
Cowrie • Generate new 
SSH keys 
• Changed banner 
• Changed Hostname 
• Changes shadow  
• Removed all users 
minus edna 
• Removal of edna 
account 
Kojoney • Modified 
credentials.py file 
• Generate new 
SSH keys 
• Changed banner 
• Changed Hostname 
• Changed fake IP 
• Changed ifconfig 
• Removed all users 
minus edna 
• Removal of edna 
account 
XSweet • Add iptables rule 
• Generate new 
SSH keys 
• Changed banner 
• Changed Hostname 
• Changed netstat 
• Changed ifconfig 
• Changed passwd 
• Removed all users 
minus edna 
• Modified 
xsweet_protocol.py 
file 
 
• Removal of edna 
account 
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Kippo 
There are three Kippo honeypots variants installed in the Services-NET as identified in 
the table above.  The first variant Kippo-1 is the default build as downloaded with no additional 
changes made to the honeypot configuration files.  Since the default port for the honeypot was 
port TCP 22, which is what we want, the real OpenSSH service on this host was moved to port 
TCP 2222 and accessible via the Admin-NET.  Kippo on default allows multiple combinations 
of credentials, such as root/root or root/12346 to successfully login to the interactive shell.  Any 
number of guessed combinations is largely successful and quite certainly gives away the host as 
a honeypot.  In addition, in the default download and installation of Kippo includes Kippo-Graph 
which renders the honeypot logs into nice interactive charts, metrics, and can replay recorded 
Shell TTY interaction.  The results are stored in a local MySQL database.  See figure 17 for an 
example of Kippo-Graph. 
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Figure 17: Kippo-Graph – built in web user interface displaying the honeypot metrics and data analysis 
 Kippo-2 was a clone of Kippo-1 but underwent changes to its configuration files to 
change its responses, appearances, and more.  The first changes were the banner statement.  As 
seen in figure 18 is a snippet of the Kippo.cgf configuration file where the banner was changed 
to reflect a system you may be attempting to mimic.  In this case, the standard banner for a real 
OpenSSH 6.6.1p1 Ubuntu was used.  Additional changes included the name of the host from the 
default svr04 to clover, seen in figure 19, which will appear in the shell command prompt once 
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inside the honeypot.  The IP information that is returned for issued commands by the attacker 
such as ifconfig and netstat were also updated to reflect the honeypots real IP of 10.1.24.217.   
 
Figure 18: Kippo.cfg configuration file changing the banner statement 
 
Figure 19: Snippet of the Kippo configuration file where the hostname was modified from sdvr04 to clover.   
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 Kippo-3 is a clone of Kippo-2 with the all possible credentials have been deleted thus 
only allowing for access to the login prompt and the TCP socket itself.  The intention is to see if 
leaving the configuration, the same as Kippo-2 but not allowing access to the honeypot shell, 
deceives attackers in to thinking it is real.  This allows for the focus to be within the scope of the 
“front door” and what clues or indicators perhaps divulge its existence as a honeypot. 
Cowrie 
 Variants 1, 2, and 3 are deployed for Cowrie following the same pattern as Kippo.  The 
default port for Cowrie was port 22 so the real OpenSSH service was moved to port TCP 2222 
and accessible via the Admin-NET.  In addition, a plethora of default credentials combinations 
can login and interact with the emulated shell.  Figure 20 depicts the configuration difference for 
Cowrie-2 and 3 using the diff utility showing the hostname name changed to Shamrock and the 
banner to the same OpenSSH 6.6.1p1 Ubuntu.  Configuration changes made, SSH keys were 
generated and the honeyfs/etc/shadow file was updated to only reflect the edna account in 
Cowrie-2.   
 
Figure 20: Results of diff utility showing changes made to Cowie configuration file 
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Kojoney2 
Same setup as the previous two honeypots, Kojoney2-1 is the default configuration.  For 
Kojoney2 variants 2 and 3, the configuration changes include the SSH keys, banner version, and 
updating the IP addresses in various commands executed within the honeypot such as ifconfig, 
netstat, and more.  To demonstrate some of the procedural work involved to get this legacy 
honeypot functioning, snippets of the command execution history (.bash_hostory) file for the 
system in which kojoney2 was install is reviewed.  Looking at figures 21 through 24 gives a raw 
glimpse into the commands with some trial and error to get kojoney2 successful functioning.   
 
Figure 21: Snippet of the .bash_history file listing commands executed to get kojoney2 deployed 
The honeypot package is downloaded using the git utility from the authors github 
webpage. Referencing the included readme file, several of the required packages are install using 
apt-get and pip.  The main file kojoney2 is attempted to be executed which returns execution 
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errors on missing dependences which are not included in newer releases of python by default and 
not explained in the readme file due to be historical in nature.   
 
Figure 22: Continuation of snippet of the .bash_history file listing commands executed to get kojoney2 deployed 
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Figure 23: Continuation of snippet of the .bash_history file listing commands executed to get kojoney2 deployed 
  
Figure 24: Continuation of snippet of the .bash_history file listing commands executed to get kojoney2 deployed 
 70 
 
During the continued trial and error to get the code to execute, it was determined that a 
python package credentials.py had recently updated its naming convention causing legacy 
applications to not import the module correctly.  The credentials.py module seen in figure 26 was 
modified where two classes were added based on research found in internet help forums [x].  
Other python modules were reviewed upon receiving execution errors to further understand 
dependencies that were missing and had to be installed manually.  For example, the 
extensions.py files were reviewed which determined the ipadresses module was required.  Upon 
successfully installing all require packages and necessary adjustments to code, the honeypot 
executed and was added to the startup services with an entry to /etc/init.d. 
 
Figure 25: Continuation of snippet of the .bash_history file listing commands executed to get kojoney2 deployed 
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Figure 26: Python twisted credentials.py file modified to support legacy code found in Kojoney2 
Xsweet 
 The final emulated opensource honeypot deployed in the Services-NET is Xsweeet and 
like the others, the default install is variant 1.  The default port was set as TCP 2222 which was 
not possible to change, therefore a persistent IPTables firewall rule was added routing TCP 22 to 
TCP 2222 and the real OpenSSH service was configured to TCP port 22222.  The configuration 
changes made in variant 2 included the honeypot hostname, service version banner, and IP 
addresses in many of the utilities returned results.  Utilities such as ifconfig and netstat were 
updated to reflect the IP of the real host and fictious remote hosts in netstat as seen in figure 27.  
The /etc/passwd file was also updated to reflect the edna user.  In the situation where a 
modification could not be made in the typical setup configuration files, source python code was 
modified.   Figure 28 shows outlined in a red box where the source code was changed to make 
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the hostname charm versus the default ubuntu.  This was done to be consistent with the other 
honeypots deployed. 
 
Figure 27: Snippet of Xsweet fake_responses.py configuration file showing fake netstat response 
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Figure 28: Xsweet python code xsweet_protocol.py modified to change hostname from ubuntu to charm. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: EMPERICAL CONTROL EXPERIMENT 
In this chapter we present a baseline control experiment which is conducted against the 
targets deployed in the Services-NET of the experiment range.  The intention is to experiment 
with various levels of testing in an attempt to uncover the existence of a honeypot-based system.  
The results help us better understand the posture of the systems in the range and whether they are 
resilient to being detected.  It also helps frame the potential expected results that perhaps 
different skilled attackers could achieve.  
Control Experiment 
To prospect on honeypot detectability and gain insight on what is presented to an 
attacker, a series of tests were conducted on the experiment range Services-NET SSH systems.  
These tests consisted of penetration testing approaches at different experience levels using 
known tools and manual interaction.  Penetration testing methodologies typically begin with 
reconnaissance as the first activity that occurs in better understanding the target.  Reconnaissance 
is divided between passive and active intelligence collection where passive is occurring in others 
location besides the target and active against the actual targets.  This active activity of 
understanding the target is also referred to as foot printing [79].  For this control experiment we 
start with active reconnaissance then transition to a “hands on keyboard” manual testing where 
we are attempting to execute commands and not trying to exploit or compromise the systems in 
any manner.  
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Sweep scanning 
Referring to the list in table x in chapter 5, the identified target scope is 10.1.10.200 
through 10.1.10.219.  The first action against the target scope was a network service discovery 
scan using the tool Nmap.  This scan allows for sweeping the network range discovering 
listening ports and attempting to identify the application and running service along with its 
version.  Figure 29 depicts the grepped results from the Nmap services scan where it attempted 
to identify the software listening on the remote TCP ports. From this initial sweep, it is 
immediately obvious that two of the systems were flagged as “Kojoney SSH honeypot (protocol 
2.0)”. Surprisingly the two detected honeypots are Xsweet instances versus the actual three 
kojoney2 instances within the same target scope.  As revealed in chapter 3, the Xsweet honeypot 
project is a fork from Kojoney2.  Some honeypots have taken proactive measures to fix the 
defects that allow Nmap to detect the services based on a flaw of how it responds to malformed 
packets.  Figure 30 shows where the kojoey2 honeypot software had a code change to prevent 
Nmap from detecting in the manner it did for Xsweet.  It appears the code change I Konjoey2 did 
not carry over to Xsweet.   
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Figure 29: Nmap services sweep with output sent to grep looking for keyword open.  Results show two systems 
detected as Kojoney SSH Honeypots.   
 
Figure 30: Kojoney2 code modified to remove easy way Nmap can detect it as a honeypot.     
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Reconnaissance Scanning 
Different approaches were leveraged to conduct reconnaissance scanning in hopes of 
gleaming clues that may lead to the identification of a possible honeypot.   Using Nmap, two 
different scripts were executed against the targets in the Services-NET.  The first is the Nmap 
script ssh2-enum-algos which enumerates the number of algorithms that the target SSH server 
offers.  The script returns a verbose list of each algorithm and its supporting functionality as seen 
in figure 31 for a system that has many algorithms and figure 32 from a system that significantly 
fewer.  Figure 33 displays a system that retuned an error versus any supporting algorithms.    
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Figure 31: Nmap SSH algorithms scan result for a system within the Services-NET     
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Figure 32: Nmap SSH algorithms scan result for a system within the Services-NET.  This result appears to be less 
than the typical number of supported algorithms on a standard SSH server.       
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Figure 33: Nmap SSH algorithms scan result showing an error as the result 
To determine how this information can be useful to further identify if the target is 
potentially real versus emulated, a count of each algorithm and its supporting functional area was 
recorded.  For each system the number of algorithms supported by each area such as kex, server, 
encryption and more is listed in table 7.  Comparing this to a real SSH server that is running a 
newer version of OpenSSH, it appears the number of supporting algorithms seems to be around 
40.  Therefore, any system that returned this expected number was characterized as green and 
others which were lower or zero were marked as yellow.  Yellow does not indicate a honeypot 
but more so a suspicion that something is off base.    
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Table 7: Nmap SSH algorithms count for each target and its specific supporting area.   
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10.1.10.200 0 0 0 0 0 0  
10.1.10.201 2 2 12 2 2 20  
10.1.10.202 6 2 9 2 3 22  
10.1.10.203 8 4 16 19 2 49  
10.1.10.204 0 0 0 0 0 0  
10.1.10.205 6 2 9 2 3 22  
10.1.10.206 0 0 0 0 0 0  
10.1.10.207 7 3 15 19 2 46  
10.1.10.208 0 0 0 0 0 0  
10.1.10.209 2 2 12 2 2 20  
10.1.10.210 7 3 15 19 2 46  
10.1.10.211 7 3 15 19 2 46  
10.1.10.212 8 4 16 19 2 49  
10.1.10.213 0 0 0 0 0 0  
10.1.10.214 0 0 0 0 0 0  
10.1.10.215 0 0 0 0 0 0  
10.1.10.216 7 3 15 19 2 46  
10.1.10.217 2 2 12 2 2 20  
10.1.10.218 7 3 15 19 2 46  
10.1.10.219 7 3 15 19 2 46  
 
The second executed Nmap script named ssh-auth-methods returns the authentication 
methods which a particular SSH server supports.  Different categories of authentication are 
captured for each of the target systems such as password, keyboard interactive and public key.  
Referring to table 8, the list of targets and their response back from the scrip is listed.  As an 
intuative method, if only one authentication method returned then the target was classified as red.  
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Yellow for two different methds and green from all three.  If an error was received stating this 
query was not supported then an automatic red was assigned. 
Table 8: Nmap SSH algorithms count for each target and its specific supporting area.   
 Password Keyboard 
Interactive 
Publickey error  
10.1.10.200 X  X   
10.1.10.201  X X   
10.1.10.202 X X X   
10.1.10.203 X  X   
10.1.10.204 X     
10.1.10.205 X X X   
10.1.10.206    X  
10.1.10.207 X X X   
10.1.10.208    X  
10.1.10.209 X X    
10.1.10.210 X X X   
10.1.10.211 X  X   
10.1.10.212 X X X   
10.1.10.213 X     
10.1.10.214 X     
10.1.10.215    X  
10.1.10.216 X X X   
10.1.10.217 X X    
10.1.10.218 X X X   
10.1.10.219 X X X   
 
In addition to Nmap, Metasploit was leveraged using the module named detect_kippo.  
As described in chapter 3 this module sends unexpected data to the remote network SSH service 
and checks for specific error messages in response. Referencing figure 34, the module is 
accessed through the Metasploit msfconsole where it discovered eight targets as Kippo 
honeypots.  Surprisingly the six identified honeypots are Kippo, Kojoney2, and Xsweet but not 
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Cowrie most likely due to the same proactive code correction which prevented Nmap from 
successfully detecting.   
 
Figure 34: Metasploit detect_kippo module executed the against Services-NET target scope which returned eight 
systems detected as Kippo honeypots.     
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Manual testing 
After performing a sweep and conducing reconnaissance scans, manual interaction 
testing was performed against the various systems.  The first approach attempted to create a 
persistent file within the filesystem, for those that allow login.  Persistent meaning creating a file, 
that is visible in a directory listing, that can be read or written to, and exists after a logout and re-
login.   Table 9 lists the results of this test where green designates normal results, red the 
persistence failed, and “No login” signifying it was not possible to get past the login prompt.  
Figure 35 displays an example of how a file being created is not persistent after login.   
Table 9: Results of manual testing showing persistent file creation and execution commands 
 Persistent file 
10.1.10.200 No login  
10.1.10.201  
10.1.10.202 No login  
10.1.10.203 No login  
10.1.10.204  
10.1.10.205  
10.1.10.206  
10.1.10.207  
10.1.10.208 No login  
10.1.10.209 No login  
10.1.10.210  
10.1.10.211  
10.1.10.212  
10.1.10.213  
10.1.10.214  
10.1.10.215  
10.1.10.216 No login  
10.1.10.217  
10.1.10.218 No login  
10.1.10.219 No login  
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Figure 35: Example of where persistence failed after a file was created and no longer visible after re-logging back 
into the system     
Going beyond the persistence file test, specific commands are attempted on each 
accessible system to see how or if they execute as expected.  These living off the land commands 
are typically found natively on a Linux operating systems and are commonly referred to for use 
in the Red Team Field Manual [80].  Many of the emulated honeypots have built in commands 
such as ifconfig that simulate the functionality.  These commands and their response can be 
modified within the honeypot configuration as seen in chapter 4.  The commands which were 
executed included in many cases a specific argument that added a bit more complexity than just 
executing as is.  For example, attempting to execute the command “ifconfig eth0” versus just 
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“ifconfig” should return the network configuration for just the eth0 network interface and not a 
generic response.  Figure 36 displays where this failed to show just the eth0 adapter information 
versus the entire generic output. Additionally figures 36 through 39 gives examples of 
commands being executed on different systems where some fail and other fully succeed.    
 
Figure 36: Example of how the ifconfig command did not function properly where it showed of only showed the 
eth0 adapter information in the second command     
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Figure 37: Example of an emulated honeypot where basic Linux commands fail to properly execute or are not found 
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Figure 38: Example of an emulated honeypot where basic Linux commands fail to properly execute or are not found 
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Figure 39: Example of an emulated honeypot where basic Linux commands fail to properly execute or are not found 
Table 10 lists the successes and failures of executing these specific commands.  The 
attempted commands are listed across the top of the table. These commands should be default on 
a standard Linux build. For each command and any respective argument, if execution fails 
outright or is not found then it is an immediate red, scored as a 1. If the command executes, for 
the most part, but acts strangely then it is yellow, as a 2.  If the issued command executes fully 
with no abnormalities, then its marked as green with a score of 3.  The use of a “-“ signifies that 
the system could not be logged into and thus was not able to be tested in this manner. 
 As a tally or heatmap, a final color is given for each system where the average is 
calculated.  The heatmap scoring follows the schedule of 1 - 1.99 is red, 2 – 2.99 is yellow, and 3 
is green.  As an example, using 10.1.10.204 there are 10 yellow points, 5 red, and 6 green which 
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sums to a total of 21 points.  The 21 points are divided by the total number of executed 
commands which is 11 and produces the average of 1.45.   
Table 10: Results of manual testing showing persistent file creation and execution commands 
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10.1.10.200 - - - - - - - - - -   
10.1.10.201 2 1 3 1 1 1 3 1 2 2 2 1.72 
10.1.10.202 - - - - - - - - - -   
10.1.10.203 - - - - - - - - - -   
10.1.10.204 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1.45 
10.1.10.205 1 1 3 2 3 1 3 1 3 2 2 2.00 
10.1.10.206 2 1 1 2 1 1 3 1 2 2 2 1.63 
10.1.10.207 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.00 
10.1.10.208 - - - - - - - - - -   
10.1.10.209 - - - - - - - - - -   
10.1.10.210 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.00 
10.1.10.211 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.00 
10.1.10.212 2 1 3 2 3 1 3 1 3 2 2 2.09 
10.1.10.213 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.00 
10.1.10.214 2 1 1 2 1 1 3 1 2 2 2 1.63 
10.1.10.215 2 1 1 2 1 1 3 1 2 2 2 1.63 
10.1.10.216 - - - - - - - - - -   
10.1.10.217 2 1 3 1 1 1 3 1 2 2 2 1.72 
10.1.10.218 - - - - - - - - - -   
10.1.10.219 - - - - - - - - - -   
 
The ending high level results are seen in Table 11 for each of the three testing categories.  
Using the same heatmap approach seen in the above command execution testing table, a final 
tally is presented across all testing areas.  For those tests that were not possible due to not being 
able to login in where marked with a “-“and not included in the overall calculation.  These 
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holistic results are then used to determine if it is believed to be a honeypot, there is suspicious it 
is a honeypot, or not a honeypot.  Also, if a honeypot is confirmed detected by tools then they ae 
marked with a “*” and automatically disbelieved (as red).  The more detailed overview of the 
results will be reviewed in chapter seven. 
Table 11: Heatmap of overall results for all three testing categories 
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10.1.10.200 3 2 3 2 - - 2.50 
10.1.10.201 3 2 *1 2 1 1 1.66 
10.1.10.202 3 2 3 3 - - 2.75 
10.1.10.203 3 3 3 2 - - 2.75 
10.1.10.204 *1 2 *1 1 1 1 *1.16 
10.1.10.205 3 2 3 3 1 2 2.33 
10.1.10.206 2 2 *1 1 1 1 *1.33 
10.1.10.207 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.00 
10.1.10.208 3 2 *1 1 - - *1.75 
10.1.10.209 3 2 *1 2 - - *2.00 
10.1.10.210 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.00 
10.1.10.211 3 3 3 2 3 3 2.83 
10.1.10.212 3 3 3 3 1 2 2.00 
10.1.10.213 3 2 3 1 3 3 2.50 
10.1.10.214 *1 2 *1 1 1 1 *1.16 
10.1.10.215 3 2 *1 1 1 1 *1.50 
10.1.10.216 3 3 3 3 - - 3.00 
10.1.10.217 3 2 *1 2 1 1 *1.66 
10.1.10.218 3 3 3 3 - - 3.00 
10.1.10.219 3 3 3 3 - - 3.00 
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The scores in table 11 are raw and represent a total as a part of a scoring mechanism.  As 
the control experiment was conduct and he various tests passed or failed, scores for each were 
summed and averaged to deduce if closer to a score of 3 the more real the system is.  To get the 
percent of success in detection, the percent calculation is the score minus one with the sum 
divided by two. For example, in 10.1.10.207 the score is 3.0. The calculation is (3.0-1)/2 which 
equates to 1 or 100%.  Another example is system 10.1.10.214 where the score was 1.16.  The 
calculation is 1-((1.16-1/)2) which equals .92.  In the case of the pure honeypot 10.1.10.210 and 
10.1.10.219 came back as 3 based on the experiment results suspecting and scoring it was a real 
system.  In this case knowledge of the actual state of each machine is required to accurately score 
their success percent.   
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CHAPTER SIX: PARTICIPANT-BASED EXPERIMENT 
In this chapter we introduce the use of participants into the experiment range.  Like the 
control experiment, each participant will attempt to identity which services in the Services-NET 
are indeed honeypots, are suspicious of being a honeypot or not a honeypot.  The main idea is to 
introduce a diverse set of individuals and skills that will be corelates to a defined attacker profile 
discussed in chapter 2.  Upon successful recruitment, each participant will be asked to take a 
survey of their skills, complete a score card of their testing results, and conduct and option exit 
survey on the results.    
Participant Recruitment 
The UCF Institute Review Board (IRB) approved the participant-based experiment using 
human testing on August 17th, 2018.  Being a cyber professional myself, the availability and 
ability to engage cyber and IT professionals of all skill levels was trivial.  Recruitment began 
immediately after IRB approval by sending the flyer in Appendix A to 15 individuals.  Some of 
those individuals referred additional potential participants which equated to a total of 20.  
After identifying the potential participates, each was sent the IRB Adult Consent form to 
review and respond by electronically via email that they acknowledge and agree to participate.  
The Adult Consent form reviewed the overall experiment, expectations for involvements, 
restrictions for minors or those that do not have the right skills or computer access, privacy and 
more.  The total number of participates that agreed to the consent was 16.  The outcome of 
participation and metrics will be discussed at the end of this chapter.   
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Survey, Connecting and Instructions 
Upon agreement to the Adult Consent form, each participant was sent material that 
included a skills survey, connectivity information, and a set of instructions.  The survey is seen 
in appendix B where the red outlined portion is shared with the participants and the rest is used 
to calculate the overall skills scoring.  The survey consists of questions that evaluate the 
participants overall technical skill acumen in multiple disciplines to include cyber and general 
information technology.  Each category was asked to be rated 0 through 10 where 0 is no skills 
in that area and 10 is a subject matter expert.  Some questions were yes or no such as “Have you 
ever discovered a zero day?”.  In this case yes equals 10 and no is 0.  Each question score can be 
weighed differently if necessary to help calibrate based on an intuitive view of its much threat 
impact in this range and participant experiment.  For example, having knowledge of database 
technologies may be .25 where discovering a zero day is 5.0. The weights for each question are 
summed and averaged to a total of 1.0.  Using this weight, the participant entered score for a 
question is multiplied by the weight to produce the score result.  So, if a participant put 4 out of 
10 on the question about database knowledge then its score result is 1.  All question score results 
are summed and averaged to produce a final participant skill score from 0-10.   
The connection information consists of the participants VPN certificates and 
configuration file, usernames, passwords, and assigned endpoint attacker Kali platform IP which 
is hosted in the Attacker-NET portion of the range.  The VPN configuration file automatically 
provides all the connection information to the participants VPN client to connect to a dynamic 
Domain Name Service (DNS) of deception.ddns.net.  Their certificate enables two factor 
authentication with the use of their VPN password.  Once a VPN connection is successfully 
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established then they can access all devices on the Attacker-NET or Services-NET from their 
remote system.  It is encouraged to use their assigned Kali platform to have a record of their 
activity, but the option exists to use their own.   
The set of instructions given to each participant is seen in appendix C.  The instructions 
start by first establishing the objective with the focus being on attempting to discover which 
services are either an SSH honeypot service or not.  They are told to use any TTP or tool 
available, but they must document how you came to their decision for each IP/port.  The 
documentation is requested to include each IP/Port tested, the outcome (yes, a honeypot, no not a 
honeypot, suspicious of being a honeypot), why they decided one way or the other, supporting 
tool information, screen shots or anything else that would be helpful.  Furthermore, the objective 
states that if they can not find any indication or supporting evidence of the service being a 
honeypot, then assume it is not and select “No, not a honeypot”.   
The instructions depict the experiment range to give a visual topology of how the systems 
are interconnected.  Details are provided on the Attacker-NET and how they are provided a Kali 
Linux system and can request a Windows 10 system if desired.  The target scope IPs in the 
Services-NET are provided with the focus solely being on the SSH service on TCP port 22.  
They are asked not to deviate from the defined scope or laterally move from inside an accessed 
target system.  For example, once they access a system in the Services-NET, do not from that 
point of presence scan, probe, or SSH to other systems.  This was to prevent them from possibly 
seeing information about other ports listening on the honeypot systems that were not intended to 
be in scope for this experiment.   
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The instructions also cover some ancillary items such as privacy, OSINT file, prizes, and 
scoring.  First is the overview of privacy of each participant and how their, identify and 
participation will be protected from disclosure and will abide by UCF policies and procedures in 
data retention, security, and destruction.  Next is describing the OSINT file provided on each 
Kali system as a potential accurate guide to what systems have some working passwords and 
more.  The intention of the OSINT file was to prevent wasted time attempting to brute force 
passwords that would never work.  As described in Chapter 4, some systems in the Services-
NET had no username and password combinations that would work as the intention was to 
assess the system from the login prompt only. The Scoring is described where each correct 
answer is worth 1 point.  Each wrong answer is -1 point.  If suspicious is selected, then no points 
are given or reduced.  Maximum number of points is 20.  Finally, prizes are discussed on the 
amount and as primarily a token of appreciation for participating in the experiment and providing 
valuable results.   
The instructions end with describing the expected returned results, namely the skills 
survey, scorecard and exit survey.  An overview of how to complete the skills survey is 
described with heavy emphasis on the importance of being as honest as possible.   A scorecard 
template is provided to give an example of what the expected returned results should look like.  
Using this exact template is not required but more so to reflect what information is to be 
collected for each IP/port.  The exit survey is the last item to be discussed in the participant 
instructions as the final task that can be optional to complete.  The exit survey is given to each 
participant upon receiving their competed skills survey and scorecard asking a series of questions 
about their experience, what they found hard or easy, and more.  The option was also given to 
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provide feedback on anything that was not mentioned or asked for specifically.  The exist survey 
questions are seen below, and a summary of the results is in the next chapter:    
Exit Survey Questions: 
1. What tool did you seem to leverage the most? 
2. What was your overall strategy to attempt and identify which services were honeypots 
and which were not? 
3. Did having the OSINT intelligence help you in any way? 
4. Can you identify what sort of honeypot software projects were used (i.e.: software 
name)? 
5. Have you heard of any other honeypots for secure shell that were not used in this 
experiment? 
6. What was the easiest part in identifying potential honeypots? 
7. What was the hardest part of identifying potential honeypots? 
8. If you were to design an SSH honeypot, what sort of features would you focus on most to 
further obfuscate it from being identified? 
9. About how many hours did you spend on the experiment overall? 
10. What IP was the fastest to identify and why? 
11. What IP made you seem the most unsure? 
12. Do you have any other information or feedback you wish to share? 
Participant Outcome 
The experiment range was open for participant testing on September 3rd, 2018 November 
20th.  During this time participants have taken part in completing the survey, conducting testing, 
providing a scorecard, and in most cases answering the exit survey questions.  Table 12 will list 
the contribution for each participant while figure 40 will give the totals.  Out of the total 
individuals sent the flyer, 80%, or 19 individuals, agreed to the Adult Consent form.  During the 
IRB submission, the outline protocol document for this experiment listed the desired completion 
to be from 8-10 participants.   
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Table 12: Participation outcome thus far results for experiment 
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1 x x x    
2 x x x x x x 
3 x x x x x x 
4 x x x x x x 
5 x x x    
6 x x x x   
7 x x x x x x 
8 x x x x x x 
9 x x     
10 x x x    
11 x x     
12 x x x x x x 
13 x x     
14 x x     
15 x x x x x  
16 x x x x x  
17 x x     
18 x x x    
19 x x x x x  
20 x x     
21 x      
22 x      
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Figure 40: Metrics on participation outcome for participant-based experiment 
The impetus is having skilled individuals participate in the experiment to give insight into 
the ease or difficulty of detecting honeypots systems of different characteristic and 
configurations.  Having different participants also opens the possibility for identifying systemic 
or unique approaches.  The results for of the participant-based experiment will be reviewed in the 
next chapter.  The results of each participant will be compared to one another and to the outcome 
of the control experiment.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
This chapter covers the results for both the empirical control and participant experiments.  
We want to answer specific questions from the experiment results that will be used as input to 
conduct modeling and develop a framework.  For this we consider the detectability and in 
choosing the right honeypot application.  We also explore how different levels of attacker skills 
corelate to the success of detectability. The questions to be answered are as follows: 
• How do real systems, pure, and emulated honeypots compare from an interactive 
and non-interactive state in their ability to not being detected? 
• How effective are the different types of emulated honeypots both from an 
interactive and non-interactive state in not being detected? 
• Do custom changes to the honeypots change its detection susceptibility? 
• How does varying participant skill scores influence the overall detectability 
success across all the different tested systems? 
Using the data and in answering the above questions, we corelate and compare the results 
of each tested system by grouping them into their respective category by type and interaction. 
Additionally, we create random generated values for both the scorecards and participant skill 
surveys leveraging standardized parameters from the actual results, such as the mean and 
standard deviation.  We use this to deduce a set of predictable results based solely on the 
empirical and participant data which is leveraged in further modeling and a framework.  Lastly 
using the participant sills survey results, we corelate and observe the aptitude for diverse attacker 
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levels to detect the presence of the deceptive software.  Figure 41 is the high-level approach to 
the experiment results and the major areas covered in this chapter.   
 
Figure 41: High-level areas of focus for experiment results data 
Experiment Scorecard Data 
Beginning with the participant-based experiment, the raw scorecard data is listed in table 
13.  The raw date follows the scoring model where if a participant got the answer correct and 
identified the system they received 1 point.  If they marked the system as incorrect they received 
-1.  If they marked as suspicious they got 0 points.  To simply the results and make it easier for 
data comparison, table 14 was constructed to normalize the data in which 1 point was assigned if 
the participant got the right answer and 0 points otherwise.  If any participants marked 
suspicious, then their supplemental notes and reasoning were used to make a case by case 
decision on if their suspicion was correct or not.   
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Table 13: Raw data results for participant-based experiment  
Honeypot type 
IP/Honeypot/Can Interact 
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 200-No-No 1 -1 -1 0 1 -1 1 1 1 
Kippo 201-Yes-Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Cowrie 202-Yes-No 1 -1 0 0 1 -1 -1 1 -1 
 203-No-No 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 
XSweet 204-Yes-Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Cowrie 205-Yes-Yes 1 1 1 -1 1 -1 0 1 0 
Kojoney2 206-Yes-Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 207-No-Yes 1 1 -1 0 0 1 -1 1 -1 
Kojoney2 208-Yes-No 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Kippo 209-Yes-No 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
pure 210-Yes-Yes -1 1 1 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 
 211-No-Yes 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 
Cowrie 212-Yes-Yes 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 0 1 -1 
 213-No-Yes 1 -1 -1 1 0 -1 1 1 -1 
XSweet 214-Yes-Yes 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Kojoney2 215-Yes-Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 216-No-No 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 
Kippo 217-Yes-Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 218-No-No 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 
pure 219-Yes-No -1 -1 -1 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 
 
  
 103 
 
Table 14: Normalized data results for participant-based experiment  
Honeypot type IP/Honeypot/Can Interact 
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200-No-No 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Kippo 201-Yes-Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Cowrie 202-Yes-No 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0  
203-No-No 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 
XSweet 204-Yes-Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Cowrie 205-Yes-Yes 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Kojoney2 206-Yes-Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
207-No-Yes 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Kojoney2 208-Yes-No 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Kippo 209-Yes-No 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
pure 210-Yes-Yes 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0  
211-No-Yes 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 
Cowrie 212-Yes-Yes 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0  
213-No-Yes 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
XSweet 214-Yes-Yes 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Kojoney2 215-Yes-Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
216-No-No 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 
Kippo 217-Yes-Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
218-No-No 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 
pure 219-Yes-No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 After normalizing the participant scorecard data, analysis was conducted against each 
system type, comparing emulated honeypots from an interaction and configuration perspective.   
In figure 42, the system types for all configurations are compared where pure honeypots scored 
the least at only 22% detection success.  Emulated honeypots reached a total of 84% successful 
detection with real systems at 59%.  Looking closer at the interaction level, figure 43 shows a 
similar trend with pure being the lowest and emulated the highest.  It is with no surprise that the 
interactive emulated honeypots had the highest detection success based on having the ability to 
 104 
 
interact with the system.  Figure 44 focuses specifically on the emulated honeypot type where 
non-interactive Cowrie was the most successful at not being detected.  Non-interactive XSweet 
was N/A for non-interactive as it was not a part of the experiment range target scope.  Figure 45 
considers the build type and whether the emulated honeypot was a default deployment or custom 
configured.  There was no real difference between the custom and default builds from a detection 
success.  Configuration as being what was changed within the emulated honeypot software 
config files.   
 
Figure 42: Comparing system types from a successful detection perspective.    
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Figure 43: Comparing different system types and interaction level from a successful detection perspective.   
 
Figure 44: Comparing emulated honeypots and its interaction from a successful detection perspective.    
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Figure 45: Comparing successful detection for emulated honeypots from an interaction and configuration 
perspective.    
 Referencing the control experiment results depicted in chapter 5 table 11, each system is 
given a score of 0-3.  Recalling that 0-1.99 defines 100% detected as a honeypot and 3 as a 100% 
real system while the range in between 2-2.99 is considered suspicious and not fully confirmed.  
The closer to 3 the more likely the odds of the system being real and equally for honeypots in the 
other direction.  To take the suspicious scores into consideration, the raw score data will be 
normalized like the participant score data where it will be a 1 for correct and 0 for false.  For this 
we will use a threshold to set the limits that can take on any value between 2-2.99.  North of the 
threshold is a real system and south a honeypot. For this research we will use the average score 
for all twenty systems which is 2.64 or 82% where the mean is considered real.   Below in table x 
are the empirical control experiment results.  The percent are based on the calculation described 
at the end of the control experiment chapter.   
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Custom Non-Interactive 100% 33% 89% 0
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Table 15: Normalizing control experiment data  
System/ 
Honeypot/ 
Interaction 
Control 
Experiment 
Score 
Percent Resulting 
Normal 
score 
200-No-No 2.50 75% 1 
201-Yes-Yes 1.66 67% 1 
202-Yes-No 2.75 13% 0 
203-No-No 2.75 88% 1 
204-Yes-Yes 1.16 92% 1 
205-Yes-Yes 2.33 34% 1 
206-Yes-Yes 1.33 84% 1 
207-No-Yes 3.00 100% 1 
208-Yes-No 1.75 63% 1 
209-Yes-No 2.00 50% 1 
210-Yes-Yes 3.00 0% 0 
211-No-Yes 2.83 92% 1 
212-Yes-Yes 2.00 50% 1 
213-No-Yes 2.50 75% 0 
214-Yes-Yes 1.16 92% 1 
215-Yes-Yes 1.50 75% 1 
216-No-No 3.00 100% 1 
217-Yes-Yes 1.66 67% 1 
218-No-No 3.00 100% 1 
219-Yes-No 3.00 0% 0 
 
Figures 46 and 47 depict comparisons between the control and participant experiment 
scores.  Both experiments followed a similar trend particularly for the Cowrie honeypot.  The 
control experiment scored higher for Cowrie on interactive while the participant-based 
experiment scored higher in non.  Both experiments resulted in almost no scores for the pure 
honeypots with only participant scoring 22% in the interactive variant.  The control experiment 
scored slightly higher in both the emulated and real systems.   
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Figure 46: Comparing emulated honeypots from participant and control experiments both for non-interactive and 
Comparing emulated honeypots and its interaction from a successful detection perspective.    
 
Figure 47: Comparing different system types from participant and control experiments both for non-interactive and 
Comparing emulated honeypots and its interaction from a successful detection perspective.    
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Experiment Skill Survey Data 
  The raw participant skill survey data is listed in table 16.  Each subject area is scored by 
each participant where 0 is no skills and 10 is an expert.  An Intuition weight is used to help 
calibrate the questions based on relevance.  Some questions are more pertinent to the skills 
needed to conduct cyber testing activities within the participant-based experiment focus areas.  
The main idea was to determine their overall technical and logical skill set to get a good idea of 
their overall technical capabilities and potential attacker threat.  For all the results discussed in 
this chapter and used in subsequent chapters, the intuition was set to 1.  The totals for each skill 
focus area and for each participant are also listed.  The totals highlight the areas which seem to 
be the strongest and likewise the weakest.  Figure 48 shows this visually where “Have you ever 
compromised (exploited) a computing system” is the highest and “Unique coding languages 
(Lisp, Prolog, etc)” the weakest.  Since the last four questions are not calibrated the same as the 
other questions, being its either 0 or 10 for yes or no versus a number in between, the highest 
skill is more appropriately “Using Security tools (nmap, Metasploit, scanners, enum, queries, 
etc.)”.   
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Table 16: Raw skill survey data results from participant-based experiment  
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Ordered Participant #  9 4 8 2 6 7 3 5 1  
Reverse Engineering 1 5 4 7 1 5 5 1 2 2 30 
Exploit writing/creating 1 4 3 9 2 4 6 1 3 2 32 
Assembly Language 1 4 2 7 1 6 5 0 2 4 27 
Windows OS Internals 1 9 10 6 8 5 6 7 9 3 60 
Linux OS internals 1 9 2 5 7 6 6 5 6 3 46 
Networking essentials 
knowledge of (TCP, UDP, 
IP, ICMP, sniffing, pcap, 
config, etc.) 
1 10 6 8 8 7 6 7 8 5 60 
Using Security tools 
(nmap, Metasploit, 
scanners, enum, queries, 
etc.) 
1 10 6 9 9 8 7 6 9 6 64 
Database knowledge 
(oracle, sql, MySQL, etc.) 
1 8 8 6 6 7 8 3 9 4 55 
Malware analysis (viruses, 
packing, botnets, 
obfuscation, etc)  
1 7 2 7 1 2 4 2 2 4 27 
Reverse Engineering and 
Assembly tools (IDA, 
OllyDbg, GDB, Hex 
editors, etc) 
1 7 3 7 2 5 6 1 2 3 33 
Web application 
Penetration Testing 
1 7 6 6 6 9 8 5 10 3 57 
Evade Endpoint 
protections (HIPPS, AV, 
Sysmon, etc.) 
1 8 3 8 5 6 6 3 5 0 44 
Electronic Warfare (SDR, 
SATCOM, RF ) 
1 5 0 4 1 0 7 1 1 0 19 
Wireless hacking (802.11, 
ZigBee, Bluetooth) 
1 7 1 5 2 6 7 2 5 1 35 
web application 
development (HTML, PHP, 
Python, etc.) 
1 5 7 5 5 8 9 4 9 1 52 
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Offensive Development 
(exploit, overflows, etc.) 
1 4 3 9 1 7 8 3 5 1 40 
Scripting (Bash, 
PowerShell, Python, Perl, 
Bat) 
1 5 3 8 6 8 8 3 8 4 49 
Low level coding 
languages (Assembly, 
Fortran, C, etc) 
1 3 3 7 1 7 7 1 3 5 32 
Higher level coding 
languages (C++, Java, VB, 
etc) 
1 3 8 7 3 8 8 4 9 5 50 
Unique coding languages 
(Lisp, Prolog, etc) 
1 1 0 5 0 2 5 0 5 0 18 
System forensics and 
cybercrime skills 
1 4 1 7 0 1 5 7 5 5 30 
General Penetration 
Testing 
Skills/methodology 
1 10 6 8 7 8 8 4 9 5 60 
Incident Response 
(uncovering and detecting 
attacks) 
1 4 2 6 1 1 5 8 4 5 31 
Discovered a zero day 
before? 
1 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 20 
Have you ever 
compromised (exploited) 
a computing system 
1 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 80 
Do you  work on puzzles 
often (Sudoku, 
Crossword, etc.)? 
1 10 10 0 0 10 0 10 0 10 40 
Have you ever coded an 
exploit? 
1 10 10 10 0 10 10 0 10 0 60 
Totals divided by 10  169 129 176 93 166 170 98 150 91  
Average  6.3 4.8 6.5 3.4 6.1 6.3 3.6 5.6 3.4  
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Figure 48: Total participant scores for each survey question 
The skill and scorecard results are correlated together to depict participant performance 
based on their skills.  Figure 49 plots the detection success (scores) for all systems compared to 
the average skill level for each participant.   The 16th, 7th, and 4th participants variance between 
skills and scores almost align with very little offset.  Many of the other participants do closely 
align except for participant 12 and 15 whose scores came in much lower than their documented 
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skill results.   This can be caused by several factors such as over inflating their skill level versus 
their actual ability.  It can also mean that the higher skilled participants ran through the 
experiment quicker due to over confident in their ability to detect the systems.   
 
Figure 49: Comparing total experiment scores to average skill survey scores for each participant 
 Observing specific system types that include emulated, real, and pure compared against 
the participant skill set revels a slightly different viewpoint as seen in figure 50.  The closest 
alignment is participant 4 with the emulated system detection and participant 5 with both 
emulated and real.  Participants 1-5 appear mostly aligned where participants 6-9 demonstrate 
higher self-surveyed skills but lower scores.  Figure 51 also give a bullseye viewpoint by plotting 
the average participant score compared to the 20 target systems.  The closer to the center, the 
lower the scores are in successfully detecting the system.  It is easy to see that the lowest score 
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are the two pure honeypots where the non-interactive is in the center at 0 and the interactive at 
.22.   The emulated honeypots are the highest and furthest away at 1.0. 
 
Figure 50: Comparing different system types from a successful detection perspective to average skill scores for each 
participant    
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
All Real 71.43% 71.43% 28.57% 71.43% 100.00% 14.29% 71.43% 100.00% 0.00%
All Emulated Honeypots 72.73% 72.73% 72.73% 81.82% 100.00% 81.82% 81.82% 100.00% 90.91%
All Pure 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 50.00%
Skills 3.4 3.4 3.6 4.8 5.6 6.1 6.3 6.3 6.5
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Figure 51: Bullseye for each tested system and the average participant score.  The further away from the middle the 
higher detection success rate. 
Data Analytics and Simulation 
 To create a larger sample size larger than the one provided in the participant-based 
experiment, random data is generated.  The first task is to create a set of 2000 random skilled 
participants which range the same 1-10 seen in the actual data.  To give the data realistic 
constraints and boundaries, parameters from the actual data such as the standard deviation 
1.3271 and mean of 5.1 were used.  A histogram of the actual data compared to the random data 
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is listed in table 17.  The normal distribution producing the probabilities of achieving each skill 
level is seen for both the actual data and randomly generated date in figure 52.  The distribution 
makes it easy to see what the probability is for a given score.  It also shows how using the 
parameters from the actual data produced similar result for the randomly generated data.    
Table 17: Histogram results from actual participant data and generate random data using actual data parameters.   
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Figure 52: Normal distribution of actual experiment skill scores compared to random generated data skill scores.   
 
To create the scorecard data for each of the newly created random participants, a 
combination of logic and assumption was used.  Figure 53 illustrates the process where we will 
start with the actual scorecard data.  The data is first normalized where the participant results 
were either marked right 1 or wrong 0 versus including negative values.  After the data is 
normalized each of the random participants skill values are aligned to an attacker profile level 1-
6 as seen in table 18.  Once each random participant is aligned based on their skill rating, the 
score lookup table is created.   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Probability Actual Data 0.0002 0.0025 0.0193 0.0848 0.2117 0.2995 0.2402 0.1092 0.0281 0.0041
Probability Random Data 0.0001 0.0015 0.0144 0.0761 0.2128 0.3159 0.2490 0.1042 0.0231 0.0027
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Figure 53: Dataflow of how random data is generated from actual data parameters.   
Table 18: Attacker Bias perception profiles divided in skill ranges.  
 
 The lookup table is comprised of the average scores for each of the attacker profile levels.  
These scores are derived from the actual data.  The attacker profiles levels are assigned to the 
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actual participant skill score data and matched for levels 3 and 4.  To get values for the other 
levels 1-2 and 5-6, some logical math and assumptions were made. Referring to table 19, the 
lookup table shows that levels 3 and 4 were the average of the 3 and 4 scores from the actual 
data.   Level 3 and 4 scores were leveraged to create all other remaining levels as a baseline.  For 
example, the first item on the list is “Real – Non-interactive” where level 3 is 0.3333.  There are 
many combinations that exist in creating the math behind creating the scores for the other levels 
that are not derived from actual data.  Many approaches produce the same results while others 
differ slightly.  In our approach set level 1 as level 3 scores minus level 2.  For example, 0.33333 
minus 0.33333 resulting in 0.  Level 2 as level 4 divided in 2.  Level 5 as level 4 plus level 1.  
Level 6 as level 4 plus level 2.  If the score was greater than 1 then 1 was assigned.  If the value 
was less than 0 then 0 was used.   
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Table 19: Random data scoring lookup table that was constructed from actual data skill levels 3 and 4.  After 
random data looks up skills, it obtains percent for a particular system and then compares to threshold if it is a 0 or 1.   
 
 Referring to the process flow in figure 53, now that the lookup table is complete, and the 
random skills are generated, the assignment of scores for each random participant N can occur. 
Each random participant N takes its skill and converts it to the attacker profile level then queries 
the scores for each system in the lookup table.  A threshold from 0 to 1 is used which checks the 
retrieved lookup table score and determines if it is to assigns a 1 for right and 0 for wrong.  In the 
case of these results, the mean for all 2000 random participants which was 5.1 was used as .51.  
This Is the same mean as in the participant-based experiment.  The process of assigned scores for 
each system repeated for all 2000 random participants.   Table 20 shows a snipped of the first 6 
random participants with scores. 
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Table 20: Snippet of randomly generated data with assigned scores based on actual data through the lookup table.    
 
 Using the generated data, comparisons were conducted to understand how the random 
participants performed.  Figure 54 compares the detection success for all system types for both 
actual and random data.  In figure 55, the interaction type is included, and the actual participants 
scored higher with a 9% delta in success is for interactive pure honeypot systems.  For emulated 
honeypot systems, the variance for interactive was 7% while non-interactive was 34%.  Real 
interactive delta was 4% while non-interactive was 22%.  Figure 56 focuses solely on the 
different emulated honeypots where actual participants follows the same trend of scoring slightly 
higher than the random data.  The build type is also considered with no real difference between 
custom and default for interactive and non-interactive was only deployed as custom.   The 
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random participants scored worse in Cowrie compared to the actual participants, especially in the 
non-interactive variant.   
 
Figure 54: Comparing different system types from a successful detection perspective for both random generate and 
actual data.   
All Pure All Emulated All Real
Random Data 4.98% 75.75% 68.39%
Actual Data 11% 84% 59%
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Figure 55: Comparing different system types and their interaction level from a successful detection perspective for 
both random generate and actual data.   
 
Figure 56: Comparing different emulated honeypots and their interaction level from a successful detection 
perspective for both random generate and actual data.   
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Interactive (Random) 9.95% 81.15% 49.73%
Interactive (Actual) 22.22% 87.50% 51.85%
Non-Interactive (Random) 0.00% 61.33% 82.38%
Non-Interactive (Actual) 0.00% 40.74% 63.89%
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Experiment Participant Data examples 
 Each of the experiment participants provided a scorecard which in most cases contained 
notes and screenshots.  The below figures are examples of participant retuned artifacts with the 
first being an actual scorecard.  Table 21 lists each system in the target scope and the decision of 
their testing.  It also includes useful notes on the approach or TTP they used to come to their 
decision.  This participant and several others also included a series of screenshots showing their 
actual command execution.   
Table 21: Example returned scorecard   
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 The first screen shot in figure 57 was a returned example of Metasploit msfconsole shell 
executing the detect_kippo module and detecting several honeypots as Kippo.  The next screen 
shot in figure 58 is an interesting and unique TTP that one participant leveraged.  A new 
vulnerability was published approximately at the experiment execution start which allowed for 
the querying of users on a remote SSH OpenSSH systems.  Executing the exploit against all 
systems in scope acts as an indicator to determine if it successfully executes thus a real system.  
If the exploit does not work and the confidence on the retuning banner version fidelity is weak 
then it is most likely not OpenSSH or is an emulated operating system.  Likewise, this exploit 
worked on the pure honeypots and gave a false indication to the tester which dismissed it as a 
real OpenSSH server thus not a honeypot. 
 
Figure 57: Participant screenshot depicting Metasploit console and detect_kippo module being executed 
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Figure 58: Participant screenshot depicting the execution of a newly released exploit that enumerates the users on a 
remote vulnerable OpenSSH server.   
A small set of individuals were indeed able to identify the interactive pure honeypot.   
The main indicator was the running tee process which captures the screen output to file.  Figure 
59 shows a process list output snippet with the process running and the path to the output text 
file.   Figure 60 shows the directory listing of the identified text file path and the output file with 
the date and time.  The intention is to review this file later to see what sort of command and 
activity was conducted while an attacker was trolling the system.   
 
Figure 59: Participant screenshot depicting the process list showing the discovery of the tee process on a pure 
honeypot which was used to capture shell interaction.   
 127 
 
 
 
Figure 60: Participant screenshot depicting the directory in which the tee process dumps the shell input/output to file 
for later analysis on the pure honeypots.  
Exit Survey results 
 The exit survey was completed by most participants and included the questions listed at 
the end of chapter 6.  The table below summarizes the questions that are related directly to the 
results which can influence modeling and a framework.  The first question on most common tool 
used was almost uniform across most participants.  Nmap, Metasploit were the top mentioned.  
The second question on using the OSINT file and if it was helpful was also mostly a common 
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answer of yes but one individual said no with no other remarks.  The third question on how many 
hours were spent varied therefore the average was taken at 4.81 hours.  The forth question no 
which system seems the easiest had two top responses and the rest varied.  The final question on 
what system was the hardest also had varied answered but one system was repeated by three 
participants.  The interactive pure honeypot was also marked by one participant as the hardest 
system.  The non-interactive pure honeypot was saw by most as a real OpenSSH server.  
Table 22: Most related exit survey responses by experiment participants.   
Question Common Answer/Average 
What tool did you seem to leverage 
the most? 
Metasploit, Nmap, Wireshark, Netcat 
Did having the OSINT intelligence 
help you in any way? 
 
Most say yes but some responded with no or 
only a little 
About how many hours did you spend 
on the experiment overall? 
 
Avg is 4.81 hours with 2 being the lowest and 8 
being the max.  Most common is 4 hours 
What IP was the fastest to identify and 
why? 
 
10.1.10.204 (Honeypot XSweet variant 1) and 
10.1.10.214 (Honeypot XSweet variant 1) were 
top two answers 
What IP made you seem the most 
unsure? 
 
10.1.10.216 (Real System Openssh6.2-1) 
Results Summary 
 The ending results primarily focus on the honeypots which include both emulated and 
pure.  For the first set of summarized results, table 23 lists the participants and their identifying 
number, average skill and total score.  Table 24 lists actual participant data where each honeypot 
scores were averaged for the different interaction levels and build types.  In addition, the skill 
ranges for those participants that successfully detected the honeypot were also included.  For 
example, for Cowrie, the interactive default average was 56% with a skill range between 5.6 and 
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6.5.  In table 25, the random and control results are considered where the percent of success is 
based on the normalized scores.  To get a get sense of the overall likelihood of successfully 
detecting, the averages were taken for all three data sets.  A similar trend exists where pure 
honeypots are the lowest, Cowrie the least detected emulated honeypot, and the remaining high.   
Table 23: Overall scores and skill ranges for each type of honeypot.   
Participant # 19 3 16 2 8 12 7 4 15 AVG 
Ordered Participant # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Skill Average 3.4 3.4 3.6 4.8 5.6 6.1 6.3 6.3 6.5 5.1 
Normalized Total Score (Out of 20) 13 13 10 15 18 10 14 18 11 13.5 
Normalized Emulated Honeypot 
Only Score (Out of 11) 
8 8 8 9 11 9 9 11 10 9.2 
Normalized Pure Honeypot Only 
Score (Out of 2) 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 .22 
 
Table 24: Overall scores and skill ranges for each type of honeypot.   
Honeypot  Interactive - 
Default 
Interactive -
Custom 
Non-Interactive 
Default 
Averages 
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Kippo 100 3.4 6.5 100 3.4 6.5 100 3.4 6.5 100 3.4 6.5 
Cowrie 56 5.6 6.5 56 4.8 6.5 33 5.6 6.3 48 5.3 6.4 
Kojoney2 100 3.4 6.5 100 3.4 6.5 89 3.4 6.5 96 3.4 6.5 
Xsweet 89 3.4 6.5 100 3.4 6.5 N/A N/A N/A 95 3.4 6.5 
Pure N/A N/A N/A 22 4.8 6.5 0   11 4.8 6.5 
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Table 25: Honeypot scores for each experiment and data type (actuals and random) based on theri interaction and 
build type.  
Honeypot  Actual 
Detection 
Random 
Detection 
Control Average 
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Kippo 100 100 55 92 92 92 33 47 47 75 80 80 
Cowrie 33 56 92 55 45 55 8 33 22 32 45 56 
Kojoney2 89 100 100 92 92 92 42 56 50 74 83 81 
Xsweet N/A 94 100 N/A 92 92 N/A 62 62 N/A 83 85 
Pure 0 N/A 22 0 N/A 10 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 11 
 
To summarize the results of our experimentation, we can say that pure honeypots scored 
the lowest in being detected, especially for non-interactive with zero detection and interactive 
having only 2 out of 9 participants discovering.  We observed that real systems came in second 
for detection success, additionally with varying results on interaction levels.  Emulated 
honeypots placed last with the highest detection rate.  Most of the emulated honeypots were 
successfully detected easily with security tools except for Cowrie that continues to attempt to 
remove detection with code fixes.  Cowrie had the lowest detection scores, especially within the 
non-interactive where attackers could not interface with the actual filesystem versus just the 
login prompt and TCP service.  The customization to the emulated honeypots versus the default 
install as downloaded from their source location did not prove to be as effective in further 
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preventing the detection success.   Finally, the higher skilled participants (6 and above) found 
most of the problems and had the highest scores to include discovering the interactive pure 
honeypot.  There were exceptions where two highly skilled participants scored lower on 
detection which is suspected to be an inflation of self-skills within the survey.   
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CHAPTER EIGHT: ATTACKER MODELING AND DECEPTION 
FRAMEWORK 
In this research we focus on sampling deceptive technologies with the secure shell 
service to determine their effectiveness in being detected.  We observed our experimentation 
outcome for a small number of participants.  Results indicate honeypots mechanisms such as the 
type, interaction, and configuration dictate the potential success in its ability to be detected as a 
deception while considering attacker threat.  For this we present a deception framework to 
describe these results and conclusions.  This new framework will observe how a planned and 
deployed deception of varying mechanisms interacts with the system, attackers, and leverages 
cyber intelligence for alerting.   As deception mechanisms differ, the likelihood of subverting 
detection rests partially in the attacker skills level, in the TTPs they execute, and the cyber 
intelligence to deconflict.    
To understand the attacker, we first present the Attacker Bias Profile Perception model 
with the profiles discussed in chapter 2.  In this model, we illustrate the various attacker levels 
with their likelihood of success and threat impact.  We then use this to present the skill levels of 
each participant in the experiment and the success of detection for each of the honeypots.  Next, 
we present a set of models for abstracting the deception process.  The three referenced deception 
models discussed in the chapter 2 are reviewed and presented in a simplified manner 
representing their commonalities and individual strengths.  This abstraction is then used as a 
foundation for the deception framework.   
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Attacker Bias Profile Perception Model 
We present the attacker bias profile perception model based on the “bias” concept found 
in a dissertation by M. H. Almeshekah [17]. The concept proposed that biases are the cornerstone 
component to the success of any deception-based approach.  The attacker needs to be presented 
with a plausible deceit to fit how they are to be perceived.  Our original model is used to perceive 
and derive intuitive likelihood and impact ratings that can be further characterized and used for 
comparison of overall attacker skill and deception effectiveness.   
The model represents each attacker bias profile, outlined in chapter 2, across the average 
and empirical threat impact and likelihood of successfully detecting [6].  We define three threat 
impact levels where level 1 is low, 2 moderate, and 3 severe.  Each is assigned a likelihood 
percent for the three impact levels individually. The likelihood is the ability to successfully 
complete an attack within a specific threat impact level.  The model is not meant to represent an 
individual attacker with specific skills but more so the overall threat they can deliver. To have 
data points useful for comparison against actual experiment data, assumptions where made based 
on perceiving the attacker profiles past incidents, professional experience, and educated intuition.  
These values are listed in table 26 and as an example, Annoyance is 50% likely to succeed at 
threat impact level 1, 5% at level 2, and 0% at level 3. 
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Table 26: Threat likelihood and Impact profile assumptions 
Attacker 
Profile 
Threat 
Likelihood 
Level 1 
Threat 
Likelihood 
Level 2 
Threat 
Likelihood 
Level 3 
Threat 
Likelihood 
Level n 
Threat 
Impact 
Index (0-
3) 
Overall 
Likelihood 
of success 
Attacker 
Skill 
Level 
Annoyance 50% 5% 0% … 0.55 18.33% 1 
Cyber Crime 60% 30% 35% … 1.25 41.67% 
Terrorism 70% 45% 45% … 1.60 53.33% 2 
Hacktivism 80% 60% 50% … 1.90 63.33% 
Insider 90% 75% 55% … 2.20 73.33% 3 
Nation 
Sponsored 
100% 100% 90% 
… 
2.90 96.67% 
… … … … … … … …  
 
To obtain the overall threat “impact index” (0-3) we sum all three of the percent values at 
each impact level to compute how far it penetrates that specific level.  Continuing with the 
Annoyance example, the threat impact index, seen in equation 1, is calculated as .50+.05+0 
equaling .55 out of 3.  To obtain the overall likelihood percent we use equation 2 and divide the 
threat impact index by the total number of levels.  Annoyance likelihood percent is (.50+.05+0)/3 
= .183 meaning at the threat level .55, there is an 18% likelihood of success.  In figure 45 we 
further illustrate the model in an easily decipherable form.   
∑ (likelhood level k)# 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑘=1  (1) 
(∑ (likelhood level k)# 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑘=1 )/# 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑠 (2) 
score/total possible score     (3) 
(skill average/10) * 3      (4) 
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(((Min Skill + Max Skill)/2)/10) *3     (5) 
 
Figure 61: Abstract characterization of attacker bias profiles measured against overall likelihood of success and 
overall threat impact.   
The model numbers can be adjusted to represent newfound research or intelligence on 
any attacker profile capabilities and resulting threat.  In addition, the model is dynamic enough to 
grow to a changing landscape.  Signified by the “…”, both threat likelihood levels and attacker 
profiles can be added [9].   
Using this model approach, we can gain insight into how each participant performed in 
their scores following (3) and their overall skill impact using (4).  This is overlaid and compared 
to the overall attacker bias profile threat levels.  As seen I figure 62, referring to participant 
number 2 as an example, their average likelihood score following (3) is 75%.  Their impact is 
approximately between levels 2 and 3 while their likelihood of success concentrates mostly on 
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levels 5-6.   Participants 4 and 8 had the largest likelihood score of 90% and impact skills score 
of 6.3 or 1.89 using (4) and 5.6 or 1.68 respectively.  1-3.  In both figures, the skills remain the 
same thus the impact is unchanged.  Participant 4 had the highest skill impact and highest 
likelihood of success.   
 
Figure 62: Abstract characterization of experiment participants and their average skill impact level and system 
scores likelihood compared to the attacker bias profiles for ability to detect.   
 Applying the attacker bias profile model to the honeypots used within the 
experimentation is seen in figure 63.  Here the likelihood is the success of not being detected or 
more so subverting the attacker.  For this model, the threat impact is represented in (5) as the 
skill range from minimum, the average, and the maximum in successfully detecting the 
honeypot.  For example, the pure honeypot had a minimum impact score of 1.44, and average of 
1.70 and a maximum skill of 1.95.  In the situation where, multiple variants of a honeypot were 
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not all detected, in this case the non-interactive pure honeypot was never detected by any 
participants, assumptions need to be made on the possibility of it being detected in the future.  
This is represented by the red dashed line from the maximum skill to the max impact of 3.  For 
XSweet, the non-interactive honeypot was not a part of the experiment target scope so there is an 
unknown possibility.  Equally the red dashed line represents the possibility where in this case it 
ranges from 0-3 since no one had an opportunity before.    
 
Figure 63: Abstract characterization of attacker bias profiles measured against honeypot overall likelihood of 
successfully subverting detection and ranging threat impact levels seen.   
Abstracting of Deception Models 
The three deception models discussed in the background material in chapter 2 is viewed 
in abstract terms by simplifying their existence to a basic elementary view.  Each of the 
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deception models share common elements which make up the general premise and main idea of 
what the deception is supposed to do.  Granted each of the models have their own unique 
elements where some are more advanced and specific than others.   These similar elements can 
be grouped into three sets that include Plan & Deploy, Monitoring, and Analysis.  Using this 
grouping, the Basic model is shown in Figure 64. The many details of planning and 
implementing the deception to be “Ready” for deployment is characterized as Plan & Deploy.  
This next major abstraction of the three deception models is Monitoring which involves the 
deception being in “Production” and ready for interaction with adversarial actors.  Anyone may 
interact with a deception if visible to the outside world. During this time the deception is 
observed for feedback and analyzed for potential intelligence links.  The last set or the end in 
some cases for the deception is Analysis where the “Determination” is made on what occurred 
and if the deception was successful.  Analysis may result in further Monitoring and Plan & 
Deploy shown in the abstract model [8]. 
 
 
Figure 64: Abstract representation of the Basic Model 
 
Other deception models in abstract form reveals the same fundamental generalization with 
different flow of events.  In the Incorporated model, the deception as seen in figure 65 ends after 
the determination is made based on the feedback channels being analyzed.  For the D&D model 
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being spiral in nature, the deception can return to the Plan & Deploy state and re-start the process 
once again as seen in figure 66 [8].   
 
Figure 65: Abstract representation of the Incorporated Model 
 
 
Figure 66: Abstract representation of the D&D Model 
 
Framework for Deception 
 It is proposed in this section to illustrate a deception framework system state model 
focusing specifically on the honeypot characteristics, attackers, and intelligence.  The 
progression of the state model will be used to describe and illustrate and outline the procedural 
components of a deception with interference from attackers.  This section expands on prior work 
in modeling the state of system with deception.   
As a deception is deployed it inherently changes some characteristics about the system.  
As computing systems are extremely complex, especially at the operating system level, many 
variations during a deception can theoretically occur.  For example, System Software and 
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Services, System Activity, System weaknesses, System configuration and several others may be 
considered. To simplify this scope, three elements are considered for scrutiny within a system 
which are alpha (α), beta (β), and mu (µ). These three scrutiny elements are used for developing 
our abstract model of the state of the system.  Any number of elements could also be considered 
for inclusion but for simplicity in our example, only three suffice.  For example, alpha could be 
system files, beta system processes, and mu network traffic.  Initially, the system will be in a 
steady state which we call “Default State”. The action plan for deception changes the default 
state to a new state. This action plan is identified as “Plan/Build Transition” which transitions the 
deception to the “ready state”. The deception is then deployed. Actions by attackers may trigger 
an alerts and changes to the system state. Each of the concepts are formalized below and is 
illustrated in figure 67. 
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Figure 67: Deception Framework System State Model 
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Default State 
The system prior to implementing a deception is in a default state meaning the posture of 
the system in its current configuration regardless of what else already exists.  As the deception is 
initially implemented, various components changed thus the component is updated, the default 
state deviates.  Other factors such as operating system variations, user changes or a previous 
undetected compromise can cause subtle changes skewing what is understood as the default 
state.  For simplicity, we will limit changes to the system state based only on what we know 
namely the deception being implemented and the attacker actions. In (5) we look at the default 
state as S0 where S represents the System at state 0 with the three components set to 0 as a 
baseline.  
S0  = <α0, β0, µ0>   () 
Plan/Build Transition 
The state machine takes in to account the minimum common planning and deploying 
elements of each of the three models and represents them by the function P where  
 P(S0) = Sm     and    () 
 Sm  = <αi, βj, µk>      () 
 
The function P is based on some of the following information: 
• G - Deception Goals and Objectives 
• AB – Attackers bias or knowledge of the deception target 
• SD – What the deception is supposed to simulate or dissimilate.  The storyline of the 
deception.   
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• I – Incoming known intelligence, indicators, signatures that alert to the presence of attack 
and their TTPs. 
• T – Type of honeypot such as emulated or pure 
• L – Interaction level ranging from high to low. 
The planning and eventual deployment function P transitions the default state to the ready 
state which causes the system state to change from 0 to m after possible i, j, and k changes of 
three scrutiny elements. These changes are shown in (7). 
Ready State 
During the ready state the deception planning commences with incorporating any 
additional changes shown in  (8).  Variants of the planned deception may occur as configuration 
commences.   
 Sm  = <αi + x, βj + y, µk+z>      () 
Deploy Transition/Production State 
Once the planning is complete the deception variant can be deployed indicated by the 
component < δ> shown in (9).  The state of the machine is now at n represented by (10) where it 
is no longer being altered by the deception planning but by potential outsiders interacting with the 
deception and system.  These changes from the default state 0 to the deployable state n now include 
the implemented deception.  The state D0 shown in (11) includes delta which signifies the 
deception is in play on the new system state n which is shown as initial state of deception. 
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 D = (Sn , <δ>) where    () 
 Sn  = <αn, βn, µn>    () 
 D0 = (<α0, β0, µ0>, <δ>)    () 
  
The production state also has the attacker access, attack effect, and unknown 
vulnerability sub components [10].  The attacker accesses the system in multiple way depending 
on what is available to them from an interaction and technological perspective (TCP ports, etc.).  
As the attacker accesses the system it can produce effects that ultimately give clues about the 
actions taking place.  The attacker receives some sort of feedback on their access attempt or 
success.  For example, the access could be a port scan and the effect a TCP feedback response of 
the port being open, and a possible log enter of the attempt.  There exists a chance the attacker 
accesses the system in a manner that is unknown or zero day.  This indeed will hopefully 
produce useful intelligence on how the attack occurred unless the attacker has gained access to 
the honeypot and circumvented the ruse.  The attacker could delete logs, evidence, destroy the 
honeypot or possibly use it to attack other systems.   
The Attacker and the Problem 
Depending on the type or purpose of the deception, it may be welcoming to see an attacker 
or quite the opposite if the deception was intended to stray the attacker away.  For example, an 
attacker tries to gain access to a system and the deception attempts to deceive and confuse them.  
Another instance is the deception is used for research to understand attacker TTPs and generating 
new intelligence or ultimately indicators.  With the use of indicators introduced in the planning 
part of the deception, when attackers perform various nefarious activities they may match an 
indicator or signature and trigger an alert to their presence and will bring the system to determine 
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state.  In this case, an analysis may provide information about the attacker. The function A in (12) 
is used to denote attack(s) where phi (φ) is the attacker TTP. The The attack(s) are against the 
system state in (11) where the state could possibly be changed by the attack resulting Dk. 
 A[φ](D0) = Dk    () 
   
Indicator Transition/Determination State 
As known adversary TTPs match intelligence provided during planning, it is then 
conceivable to determine the impact and if the correlation causes a “success” or “Failure” for the 
deployed deception. With this ideal situation it is possible to know if the deception is effective or 
credible like intended or planned.  The activity generated by the attacker or anyone else for that 
matter is de-conflicted.  As unknown amounts of activity traverse the deception, it is hard or in 
most cases impossible to tell if this activity caused the deception to be successful or what the 
attacker is really executing.  The impact can range based on the attack.  In most cases the overall 
impact is minimal and just noise and possible new intelligence being collected.  For the less 
common cases, the impact can be severe as the attack can counter, kill, or use the deception to 
their advantages, hide evidence, and more. 
Case Studies 
We use the deception framework to present some of the participant-based experiment 
results. Each deception honeypot starts at an initial default state on a clean bare Ubuntu 14.04.5 
system represented as (5).  As the honeypot is planned, the function P in (6) is defined as the 
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goal, attacker bias, type, what to simulate/dissimulate, intelligence, type and interaction. Many of 
the deceptions deployed exhibit similar values for P.   
As the honeypot is downloaded, installed and configured on the server, Sm in (7) 
represents the incremented changes to the system as it transitions for the default to ready state.  
While the honeypot is pre-production and resides in the ready state, additional changes such as 
the configuration files, software packages, and more are represented by further increments to Sm  
in (8). Once the honeypot is ready for deployment, (9) represented as D contains <δ> to indicate 
a deception variant transitions to the production state and subject to attack.  The state of the 
system is understood and set as Sn in (10) and increments as changes occur with attacker access 
attempts.  The final honeypot deception is represented as D0 in (11) or as an abstract instance Dk 
in (12).  As the deception was subject to attack in the experimentation, the access, effects, and 
impact is evaluated with the deception transitioning from the production to determination state, 
and in most cases right back to production for the next attacker possible interaction.   
Case One – Kippo Emulated honeypot 
The Kippo honeypot was easily detected and thus had a low success rate for evading detection 
across all experimentation.  This was evident for participants of all skill. All variants of Kippo 
exhibited the same behavior but for this example we picked the low interaction custom build 
using the range system 10.1.10.209.  The function P is defined as having: 
• G – To measure the effectiveness of the SSH honeypot from detection evasion 
• AB – Attacker profile levels 2-4 
• SD – Simulate SSH and underlying operating system shell.  
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• I – All intelligence for attacks related to known CVE, shared repositories, opensource, 
intrusion detection packages, and more 
• T – Emulated 
• L – Low Interaction 
Access 
The attacker used Metasploit and executed the detect_kippo module.  The module looks for a 
“Protocol mismatch” and “bad packet  length” in the TCP response.  Phi in (12) is the Metasploit 
module that looks for the protocol mismatch. The below screenshot in figure 68 depicts the 
captured network traffic from the Kippo honeypot, identifying the attackers attempt to detect 
Kippo.   
 
Figure 68: TCP network traffic capture showing detect_kippo module execution 
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Effects 
There is little to no effect to the Kippo honeypot.  The effect or feedback to the attacker was the 
success of the detect_kippo module execution alerting to the presence of a deception. The 
changes to the system such as a log entry being created, and the network traffic recorded is 
captured in D0 using (11) as alpha, beta and mu increment. 
Impact  
The impact was the ability for the attacker to recognize the system was a deception and cease all 
other activities.  No impact to the actual system and its ability to function was detected.  The 
attacker traffic in figure 68 was detected as known TTPs and the determination was to resume 
the honeypot deployment as is.   
Case Two – Cowrie Emulated Honeypot 
 Cowrie exhibited a better detection evasion across the empirical and participant-based 
experimentation than any other emulated honeypot.  On average the detection was 52% for 
Cowrie for all three variants.  This was largely due to the code fix that removed the ability for 
known security tools to detect any known flaws in the honeypot TCP traffic responses.  Thus, the 
Metasploit detect_kippo module that worked on Kippo and once worked on Cowrie no longer 
functioned.  The average skill to detect was also higher than for Kippo. For this case we look at 
the high interaction custom variant of Cowrie which also included leaked credentials 
(edna/connie) to login.  The range IP for the honeypot is 10.1.10.205.  In this case the function P 
is as follows: 
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• G – To measure the effectiveness of the SSH honeypot from detection evasion 
• AB – Attacker profile levels 1-3 
• SD – Simulate SSH and underlying operating system shell.  
• I – All intelligence for attacks related to known CVE, shared repositories, opensource, 
intrusion detection packages, and more 
• T – Emulated 
• L – High Interaction 
For this case we will look at two attacks.  The first attacker (A1) is a lower skill scoring 
participant that failed in detecting the honeypot.  The second attacker (A2) is higher skilled and 
used an unknown TTP which enabled a successful detection.  The effect and impact will follow 
the same number for each attacker.   
Access 
A1 accessed the system by conventional means and logged in to the shell interface with the given 
leaked credentials.  Phi in (12) is normal SSH login and interaction traffic. The access to the 
system by executing commands is seen in figure 69.    
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Figure 69: Snippet of grepped Cowrie honeypot log showing simple commands being executed by a lower skilled 
participant.  This participant did not detect the system as a honeypot.   
 
A2 accessed the system using a newly released (as the experiment range came online) exploit 
code, Common Vulnerability Exposure (CVE)-2018-1547, which allowed for the enumeration of 
user accounts on remote SSH server [93].   
Effects 
There were no effects to the actual honeypot.  The changes to the system by A1 and A2 such as 
log files being created, and the network traffic recorded is captured as alpha, beta and mu which 
causes D0 to increment. 
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A1 received feedback by the effects on the system that gave no indication of a deception in play.   
A2 received feedback by the lack of a response in the exploit producing enumeration results. The 
same exploit executed by A2 on a different real system is seen in Figure 58.   
Impact  
A1 – The impact was minimal as the attacker was not able to detect the system as a deception.  
The effects by the commands executed in figure 70 did not trigger an alert or match within the 
intelligence analysis.  The deception resumed.   
A2 – The impact was the attacker detecting the system as abnormal in its inability to execute the 
exploit code.  Since the code executed just fine on real systems, the ones where it failed were 
flagged as deceptive.  No impact to the actual system and its ability to function was detected.  
The attacker traffic was added to the known TTPs and the determination was to resume the 
honeypot deployment as is.  In this case phi in (12) was unknown to the intelligence within the 
deception system and was caught after analysis was conducted.  The deception resumed as 
further research was conducted on how to change the response to the attacker for the honeypot 
software.   
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Case Three – Pure Honeypot 
 The pure honeypots displayed the best results regarding evading detection.  The average 
detection was 22% and the highest skilled participant contributed to detecting the honeypot.  
There were two variants with one being low interaction and the other high. For this case the high 
interaction version was studied, 10.1.10.210, and P is defined as following: 
• G – To measure the effectiveness of the SSH honeypot from detection evasion 
• AB – Attacker profile levels 3-6 
• SD – Simulate SSH and underlying operating system shell.  
• I – All intelligence for attacks related to known CVE, shared repositories, opensource, 
intrusion detection packages, and more 
• T – Pure 
• L – High Interaction 
For this case we will look at three attacks.  The first attacker (A1) is a lower skill scoring 
participant that failed in detecting the honeypot.  The second attacker (A2) is low to medium 
skilled that attempted to launch exploit code and failed in detecting the system as a honeypot.  
The third attacker (A3) is the highest skilled participant that executed the right commands 
and was able to detect the system as a honeypot.    
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Access 
A1, A2 and A3 all accessed the system using normal convention means by logging into the shell 
terminal by leaked credentials.  Phi in (12) is normal SSH login and interaction traffic.  Figure 70 
depicts the commands executed by A1, figure 71 for A2 and figure 72 for A3.   
 
Figure 70: Snippet of Pure honeypot log showing a lower skilled participant shell interaction.  Participant did not 
detect as a honeypot.   
 
Figure 71: Snippet of Pure honeypot log file listing commands by a lower to mid level attacker.  They attempted to 
execute a local exploit to develop a race condition to gain root/system level privileges.  They failed and did not 
successfully detect system as a honeypot.   
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Figure 72: Snippet of Pure honeypot log file showing shell interaction by a higher skilled participate that discovered 
the tee process with ps -ef  and location of the log files under /lib/Plymouth/themes/detail/details.ssh.   
Effects 
There were no effects to the actual pure honeypot.  The changes to the system by A1, A2, and A3 
such as log files being created, and the network traffic recorded is captured as alpha, beta and mu 
which causes D0 to increment. 
A1 received feedback that gave no indication that the system was a deception.   
A2 executed commands and attempted to download and launch an exploit to elevate their 
privileges on the system as another access method.  The exploit failed, and no commands 
execute gave indication the system was a deception.   
A3 executed commands in figure 72 which revealed the tee process.  The “ps -ef” command 
followed by changing directory using “cd” to the location where user shell interaction is recorded 
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were feedback to the attacker that this was a deception.  In this case the attacker explored a bit 
further on the system and log contents.   
Impact  
A1 had no impact as they did not discover the presence of the honeypot monitoring.  No actions 
or commands conducted matched any known intelligence and the deception resumed.  The 
determination was to resume the deception.   
A2 had no impact as they did not discover the presence of the honeypot monitoring.  A3. There 
were some intelligence matches for executing the privilege escalation exploit code.  No other 
commands or auction triggered any other alerts.   The determination was to resume the 
deception.   
A3 had the impact of identifying the deception monitoring tee process and the location of the 
logged interaction.  The “ps -ef” command followed by changing directory using “cd” to the 
location where user shell interaction is located triggered an alert to the defender.  In this case the 
attacker browsed the logs then the system a bit more before departing.  The determination was to 
stop the deception and do further analysis on what was conducted.   
In this chapter we presented a series of models and a deception framework.  We first 
presented the Attackers Bias Perception Profile model that enabled us to see how each attacker 
profile ranked from a likelihood and impact perspective.  We used this model to see how each 
participant ranked and how each honeypot system faired in its deceptive ability. We then created 
an abstraction of each deception process to develop a common foundation which is used to create 
the deception framework.  Three case studies were presented each with a unique outcome based 
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on the results from the small number of participants in our experimentation.  The case studies 
showed how each participant attacker stepped through the framework starting with their initial 
access attack vector, the effects and feedback, and overall impact.  We also showed how the 
deception is initially planned, deployed, decisions are made on continuation, and the use of cyber 
intelligence.   
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
We have contributed to further researching and experimenting with deception software.  
We identified based on the empirical control testing and the small number of experimentation 
participants that pure versus emulated honeypots performed better at evading detection.  We also 
have also demonstrated that indeed there is a correlation between the skill level of the attacker 
and the success in detecting systems as a deception.  There is of course an advantage to 
participant versus real attackers as they are aware are potential honeypots to discover.  The 
assumption is real attackers may be further deceived, not as conscious in considering deceptive 
techniques are in use. 
 We have identified and configured the SSH honeypot systems, constructed an experiment 
range, recruited participants, commenced experiment testing, and produced results.  The build 
out of the range took approximately nine months to construct and consists of three zones that are 
accessible from anywhere via virtual private networking.  Using the range, we conducted control 
and participant-based experiments against SSH honeypots and real SSH systems from an attacker 
system.  The empirical control experiment baselined and empirically explored ways the 
honeypots are detectable amongst all the systems through adversarial analysis and testing.  We 
conducted a series of tests which covered a network service sweep, then moved to scanning and 
probing of the discovered services, and finally manual hands on keyboard interaction and 
command execution.  The participant-based experiment introduced attackers of varying skills 
and potentially unique tactics, techniques and procedures in attempting to detect the honeypots.  
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The participants were recruited from a sample of individuals with professional cyber and 
information technology experience.   
 We bridged the experimental with the theoretical and used the results to create a set of 
models and present a deception framework.  The Attacker Bias Profile Perception model was 
formed to measure the likelihood and impact of attackers at different levels.  We then used our 
model to see how each participant ranked skill wise compared to the six outlined attacker 
profiles.    In addition, the honeypots were overlaid on the model to see how they fared from a 
subverting detection perspective.   
We abstracted the researched deception models to create a foundation for how deception 
is perceived.  Using this abstraction, we presented a deception framework which steps though 
and illustrates the interaction of a deception to system elements changing its overall state.  The 
framework then depicts how the attacker interacts with a deception, their TTPs, along with the 
access, effects, and impact. The deception framework is made to help cyber defender 
understands the deception process, how it interacts with attackers, and how known intelligence is 
used to better prepare for a more successful deployment.    
Future Work  
 
There are several areas to further understand the successful use of deception in Cyber.  
The ability to develop a more robust honeypot solution will always be evolutionary.  The first 
area being considered is analysis on the log files produced by each honeypots and systems.  
Analysis would include data mining, data identification, correlation and more.  The intention is 
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to research the possibility of discovering identifiers in attacker behavior when detecting 
honeypots which could be used to alert to this specific behavior.  
Another area involves the development of a robust simulator.  The simulation would 
follow a similar construction as the experiment range with the ability to change the deception 
software, its settings, responses, and more.  Random attackers would be generated at different 
skill levels following one of the attacker profiles.  Simulating could enable diverse sample and 
sizes where adjustments could be made on anticipated threat, specific deception deployments, 
and more.    
Another area for extended work which can possibly reach a wider range of actual 
participants is an online web-based survey.  The website can consist of several screenshots for 
remote SSH systems, tool output, command execution of actual honeypots, and more.  The 
participant could be given the opportunity to type in commands or select tools they would want 
to use to see the specific information or output.  Based on the screenshots, each participant 
selects if they believe the output is based on a honeypot or not.   
A bug bounty, or vulnerability reward program, could be stood up with the goal of 
hackers attempting to research and devise new detection techniques, uncover vulnerabilities, and 
discover unknown vectors of attack.  A prize schedule can be established to help entice the 
discovery of new attacks where the more complex the larger the sum.   As new items are 
discovered, they can be posted on a forum for others to see, view the prizes earned, and perhaps 
build on further.  Findings can be applied to improve the honeypot code.   
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Putting deception on a real production system to jolt the attacker is another area being 
considered.  A normal production server could have an obvious honeypot software installed to 
deceive attackers.  The honeypot would possibly cause an instinctive dismissal, further masking 
the real purpose of the system.   The reverse idea of desiring the deception to be as detectable as 
possible while having the lowest interaction level would be ideal.  The low interaction level 
would help minimize successful attacks and more.   
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APPENDIX A: PARTICIPANT FLYER 
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APPENDIX B: PARTICIPANT SURVEY 
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APPENDIX C: PARTICIPANT EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS 
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Objective: To attempt to discover which services are either a SSH honeypot service or not.  You 
can use any tool, tactic technique or procedure (TTPs), etc. but you must document how you 
came to your decision for each IP/port.  Document each IP/Port tested, the outcome, why you 
decided one way or the other, supporting tool information, screen shots and anything else that is 
helpful.  If you can not find any indication or supporting evidence of the service being a 
honeypot, then assume it is not and select “No, not a honeypot”.  In this experiment we will 
focus solely on secure shell (SSH). 
 
Honeypots can be built in numerous ways and can range in their interaction abilities ranging 
from low to high.  Some honeypots are a real system that has been modified into a honeypot to 
deceive the attacker.  Others are fully developed mock ups or simulations of a system or port. Do 
not be paranoid and think every service is a honeypot.  Assume you do not expect any honeypots 
but are always on alert.  Then if something triggers that makes you believe it is a honeypot or 
deception document and score as such.  Some honeypots will be “savvy” and may require deeper 
poking to determine if its deceptive or not.  But to formalize the definition we shall use in this 
experiment; a honeypot is any system that is deceiving an attacker while monitoring their login 
attempts and possible shell activity to either study their actions or lure them away.   
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Attackers-NET foothold:  Every participant will connect into the Attackers-NET and be given 
access to their assigned kali Linux and/or Windows 10 attacker platforms.  Account and 
connectivity information will be emailed separately to each participant.   
 
Target Scope: Services-NET 10.1.10.200 through 10.1.10.220 all focused on port 22, SSH.    No 
other IPs or devices are in scope for testing or attacking.  Also no lateral movement from inside 
any SSH server in the Services-NET.  For example, do not try to use any SSH server you gained 
SHELL access to as a pivot point to scan, attack or look at other network devices within or 
outside of the scope.   
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OSINT: Each participant will be given a piece of simulated Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) 
data that may have a username/password combination to one or more of the services hosted on 
an IP/port.  The intention is to see how further interaction with the one honeypots differs in the 
outcome. This OSINT will be saved in the /root folder of the kali Linux attacker platform. 
 
Scoring: Each correct answer is worth 1 point.  Each wrong answer is -1 point.  If suspicious is 
selected, then no points are given or reduced.  Maximum number of points is 20.  Referring to 
table one below as an example, let us assume .50 and .51 are honeypots while .52 and .53 are 
not.  The total current score would be -1.  Minus one for .50, no change for .51, minus one for 
.52 and plus one for .53.   
IP Port No, not a 
honeypot 
Suspicious  Yes, a honeypot. 
10.1.10.50 22 x   
10.1.10.51 22  x  
10.1.10.52 22   x 
10.1.10.53 22 X   
     
 
Prizes: I appreciate your support in helping me with my dissertation research.  As such everyone 
will get a prize ($50 Amazon gift card).  Please do not simply guess.  If you must guess, please 
indicate such in your notes for each IP/port. Scoring for guessing will still follow the same 
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schedule but it indicates in the research that you were not sure either way.  Please email me your 
address where you would like your prize sent.   
 
Participation Privacy: Each participant data, whether directly given in response to or generated 
because of this exercise will be protected from disclosure and will abide by UCF policies and 
procedures in data retention, security, and destruction.  No data will be shared in a manner that is 
attributed or correlated back to you as an individual.  Survey results and results from the 
scorecard will be generalized and referred to as “tester number x” where x is a sequential number 
or something to that effect.  All data during the exercise and while research is being conduct for 
the completion of a dissertation will be secured.  
 
Expected returned results 
 
Honest Survey on skill level: Attached to this email is a survey of various skills/traits that exist 
in a wide range of penetration testers and Cyber attackers alike.  The intention is to be 100% 
honest and rate yourself from 0 through 10, where 0 is none and 10 is expert (some questions are 
marked for yes/no only).  The survey helps determine the skill range of participants and to map 
that against possible cyber threat.  No details of this survey will be attributed back to anyone 
name/person specifically.  Please be as accurate and honest as you can and rate yourself on each 
skill/trait.  If you do not have Microsoft Word please email me and I will provide a PDF version.  
Please complete the survey and return, preferably before you complete the entire exercise.   
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Score Card template: 
The below table is a template of what the expected returned results format follows.  You do not 
need to follow this table format exactly as its meant to reflect what information needs to be 
collected for each IP/port.   
IP Port No Suspicious  Yes Why/explanation/screenshots 
10.1.10.200 22     
10.1.10.201 22     
10.1.10.202 22     
10.1.10.203 22     
10.1.10.204 22     
10.1.10.205 22     
10.1.10.206 22     
10.1.10.207 22     
10.1.10.208 22     
10.1.10.209 22     
10.1.10.210 22     
10.1.10.211 22     
10.1.10.212 22     
10.1.10.213 22     
10.1.10.214 22     
10.1.10.215 22     
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10.1.10.216 22     
10.1.10.217 22     
10.1.10.218 22     
10.1.10.219 22     
10.1.10.220 22     
 
Exit Survey Questions: 
Upon completing the skills survey and scorecard, a final exit survey will be sent with some 
questions about the research, your experience, and more.  The survey will be emailed to you for 
you to complete and email back. 
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